Africa Watch – Niger gets a coup

Niger President Mohamed Bazoum has been removed from power, by a group of soldiers in the West African country, hours after holding the president in the presidential palace. Colonel Amadou Abdramane and nine officers cited deteriorating security and bad governance as reasons for ending the government. Niger’s borders are closed, a curfew has been imposed around the country, and all institutions are suspended. The soldiers opposed foreign intervention and pledged to respect Bazoum’s well-being. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) dispatched Benin President Patrice Talon to lead an intervention mission to Niger following a meeting with Nigerian President Bola Tinubu.

The Russia-Africa Summit happened last week in St Petersburg with Niger’s flag flying outside, but the country was ominously absent in the seating arrangements for the event, indicating that either their delegation had left in a hurry or had not made it at all. This may be because the coup that affected important parts of Niamey’s capital occurred the night before the summit.

The coup by the presidential guard is the first of its kind in a while in the region, having eerie similarities with Idris Deby’s coup against Hisene Habre in 1990. Perhaps more than a testament to the state of political instability, it tells a story of a poor commitment to professionalise armed forces within the region. However, professionalising the armed forces is one thing. Making the ground less fertile for coups is the other, most pressing challenge that leaders in the sub-region now known as Africa’s coup belt have shied away from. Niger faces a rising cost of living crisis and perceptions of government incompetence and corruption may have prepared the coup plotters’ arguments, however, the initial groundswell opposition to the coup by Nigeriens albeit brutally suppressed presents the earliest challenges to domestic legitimacy.

Although the conspirators blame spiralling insecurity along the country’s borders given the actions of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara as well as Boko Haram’s factions, the immediate cause is a lot more parochial than the smokescreen the remote causes afford. Bazoum, a few weeks earlier had finalised plans to retire most senior officers in the military, some of them who have been in that position for over a decade. The lead coupist, Colonel-Major Amadou Abdramane, as well as Gen. Omar Tchiani, is said to be at least two of the over 10 generals on track to be affected by such changes.

For now, international legitimacy would be hard to come by, as the customary round of international condemnations from far and near fill the airwaves. For Niger’s immediate neighbours, Burkina Faso could not be as bothered as Nigeria because it is in the same fix as Niger. Nigeria’s leadership of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has so far failed to steer the community in the right direction and the delegation sanctioned by President Tinubu to intervene in the crisis in Niamey has failed to bring peace.

This leaves the axe on Niger’s international partners. The US’ and France’s condemnation of the coup however puts them in a bind. Niger is a strong ally in both countries’ regional security initiatives, also providing a great chunk of uranium used in French energy needs. The reaction to the latest coup pales in comparison to how the coup in Chad in 2021 was received. It happened at the same time Mali was having its moments. French President Emmanuel Macron, condemning Mali on one hand, rushed to Ndjamena to restate French support for young Mahmat Kaka Deby who took over the government, sidestepping the constitutionally provided line of succession.

This inconsistency is part of what fuels anti-French sentiments in the region, spurring young officers to engage in hostile government takeover and denounce France as a purveyor of neocolonial hegemony; a ploy at establishing domestic legitimacy which often wears off when the reality of the situation overpowers the honeymoon phase. Bazoum himself had survived a coup in March 2021 when his inauguration was almost scuttled by the military. Bazoum was said to be the candidate Abuja preferred, over Paris’ preferred choice, Mahamane Ousmane.

Notwithstanding, Bazoum managed to hold a middle ground in relations between Nigeria and France. This partly explains why Paris has been opposed to his ouster, in addition to the traditional concerns of the instability such a hostile change of government could pose. This is a dread the UN also shares, prompting it to propose a no-fly zone over the entire country – an aggressive proposition which is likely to achieve little while upending a key air corridor for flights transiting from Europe and the Middle East to West and Southern Africa.

Another element to consider is the regional picture. In the days following the coup, ECOWAS under Nigeria’s leadership has put on a strong showing in its response to the coup and that is down to a few reasons. Chief among them is that this is the first out-and-out coup on Nigeria’s direct borders in a really long time, and it has Abuja worried over the potential for a copycat given the well-documented discontent in the lower and mid-ranks of the Nigerian Army.

Secondly, President Tinubu whose foreign relations push has been more hands-on than his predecessor, is fighting for legitimacy given the deeply flawed elections in which he emerged president a few months ago. In recent weeks, he has taken that hunger global. The coup in Niger affords him an opportunity to burnish his credentials to Western partners who are a lot more concerned with ‘stability’ in the Sahel than ‘promoting’ democracy.

Furthermore, ECOWAS’ weak response to the coups in Guinea and Mali could be explained by the circumstances. In a way, an objective analysis of the coups in both countries would say that the heads of state, Alpha Condé and Ibrahim Boubackar Keita, had it coming following their decisions to tinker with their country’s constitutions in ways widely considered illegitimate. In Niger, there is no “legitimate” reason for Bazoum’s ouster other than a move for self-aggrandisement by a select group of overfed officers who, in the face of change, threw their toys out of the pram.

What the plotters have done is give ECOWAS a reason to discover actionable energy. Saving Bazoum is now mission-critical for the regional body. The leaders in the sub-region know that this is a fight they have to win, for their own survival. The coup plotters did not see this version of a united regional community coming.

Lastly, Bazoum has been a reliable partner for both Nigeria and the West in the fight against armed groups in the Sahel and there are fears that letting the new military leaders win will roll back gains made, setting the stage for the entry of Wagner forces and Russia whose flags are being raised in Niamey a little more than Nigerien flags. Clearly, ECOWAS’ and Nigeria’s tough talk, some of which border on potential military action, is not hot air. It is backed by France and the United States which both have bases in the region but weary of unilateral intervention in far-flung places, would be happy with supporting a regional effort.

The potential for destabilisation following an ECOWAS-led intervention is profound. The potential for the coup plotters to defy both the African Union and ECOWAS ultimatum to reinstate Bazoum and return to the barracks is equally profound. In a military confrontation, there is not much the Nigerien military can do against a combined regional force backed by foreign interests. The major risk remains a Pyrrhic victory with Bazoum presiding over the ashes of a deeply divided country in which armed groups not only have free reign but an untold number of refugees flee south across Nigeria’s badly policed borders and north across the Sahara to Europe’s southern reaches. For Abuja and many North African and Western capitals, that will represent the ultimate nightmare.