Africa Watch – Ruffling feathers

An Egyptian warship delivered a second major shipment of weapons to Somalia, including anti-aircraft guns and artillery, according to port and military officials, in a move likely to stoke further friction between the two countries and Ethiopia. The weapons were unloaded under tight security, with roads blocked off as convoys transported them to military bases. The delivery, observed by Somalia’s Defence Minister Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur, is expected to increase tensions between Egypt, Somalia, and Ethiopia. Somaliland was concerned the weapons could land in the wrong hands, including the al Qaeda-linked al Shabaab group, its foreign affairs ministry said in a statement.

This development continues Mogadishu’s response to Addis Ababa’s diplomatic gambit and geopolitical ambitions in the Red Sea. In January, an SBM report detailed how Addis Ababa’s frantic search for diverse options to secure access to the Red Sea has brought it into conflict with its neighbours, a situation exacerbated by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s October 2023 statements suggesting that his country does not rule out using force to achieve this objective. Ethiopia lost its sea access in 1993 after Eritrea gained independence following more than two years of secessionist war. Since then, Ethiopia has disbanded its navy and has relied heavily on Djibouti for its foreign trade.

This urgency to reduce dependence on Djibouti led Ethiopia to Somaliland, Somalia’s breakaway state. Part of the port access deal between Somaliland and Ethiopia included the establishment of Ethiopian ports near the Gulf of Aden, overseen by the Ethiopian Navy, in exchange for Somaliland’s stake in Ethiopian Airlines and recognition of its sovereignty. The deal angered Mogadishu, prompting it to shift from threatening war with Ethiopia to actualising it by aligning with Ethiopia’s rivals, such as Egypt (which has a problem with Ethiopia over future water supplies from the Nile to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam), Eritrea (with which relations have become icy again following the latter’s actions in the Tigray conflict), and Turkiye (which seeks to expand its influence in Africa).

Turkish mediation preceded Ethiopia’s willingness to scale back its commitment to Somaliland. However, the past few months since June have seen an impasse that has significantly drawn Cairo into the conflict. The latest developments show how increasingly isolated Ethiopia is, with its only ally being the United Arab Emirates, which has yet to publicly commit itself to either Somaliland or Ethiopia in the event of an all-out war. Given that Addis Ababa is still reeling from the aftereffects of its years-long civil war with Tigray and with ongoing internal divisions (fighting continues in small but significant areas between Amhara and Tigrayan forces over territory), it is ill-equipped to take on a new external conflict, especially without guarantees of support from extra-regional players such as the UAE, or even Russia, with which it has had a good relationship.

This development, among others, signals that the geopolitics of Northeast Africa is changing, and perhaps not for the better for the countries in the region. The biggest beneficiaries appear to be the Middle Eastern powers, whose scramble for influence in Africa threatens to undermine the natural progression of relationships in the region, potentially leading to a re-enactment of Middle Eastern rivalries in Africa, as evidenced by Libya’s political crisis.