The week ahead – Episodes of Struggle

The Nigeria Labour Congress has announced the arrest of its President, Joe Ajaero, by security operatives. The NLC said Ajaero was arrested by operatives of the State Security Service “at the Nnamdi Azikiwe Airport Abuja this morning on his way to attend an official engagement of TUC United Kingdom, and he is now detained at the office of the NSA.” The opposition Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), while condemning the arrest of Ajaero, who has now been released, warned President Tinubu to treat the labour union matter carefully. Meanwhile, DSS officers took control of the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project’s (SERAP) Abuja office, which SERAP called an “unlawful occupation.”

The Tinubu government’s recent approach to handling dissent raises questions about the administration’s activism and free speech stance. This shift is particularly notable given Mr Tinubu’s distinguished past as a pro-democracy activist who opposed military dictatorship. His history of advocacy during Nigeria’s challenging era of military rule in the 1990s played a crucial role in opposing the Abacha regime. However, recent actions, such as the arrest of NLC president Joe Ajaero and the intervention at SERAP’s Abuja office, contradict the democratic values he previously championed. In a healthy democracy, labour unions and civil society organisations are vital for holding governments accountable and advocating for public rights. By addressing dissent through arrests and other measures, there is a risk of undermining these essential democratic structures. Instead of using heavy-handed tactics, it would be beneficial for Tinubu to draw upon his experience as a former pro-democracy advocate. Engaging in dialogue with unions and civil society groups could strengthen governance by acknowledging their important role as collaborators rather than opponents. The credibility of the Tinubu administration will depend on its commitment to listening, negotiating and upholding the freedom that was once a cornerstone of the President’s activism. Mr Tinubu faces a pivotal choice: to govern in line with his democratic principles or to risk his legacy being overshadowed by a departure from the values he once defended. The way forward will shape how history remembers his presidency.

Notorious terrorist leader Bello Turji issued a grave warning to the Hausa people of northwestern Nigeria in a newly released video. Turji accused the Hausa community of being traitors and hypocrites, alleging that they have been responsible for the killing of innocent Fulani people and their livestock in the past. Turji declared that he would wage war against the Hausa people if the killing of Fulani tribes does not cease. In the video, Turji claimed that his group possesses a variety of weapons and that the Hausa people are his primary targets, not the security operatives.

Bello Turji is known to have been responsible for numerous massacres and terrorist attacks against civilians and security forces in the Northwest region of the country, especially Zamfara and Sokoto States. In September 2021, a Yan Sakai group attacked a mosque in Gwadabawa, Sokoto, killing 11 people. Turji responded by leading his bandits towards a market in Goronyo, also in Sokoto. The bandits entered the bazaar and killed at least 50 civilians. In December 2021, Turji’s forces attacked a bus in Sabon Birni, Sokoto, setting it on fire and burning the 30 passengers inside it to death. Turji was the mastermind behind the slaughter of over 200 people in Zamfara in January 2022. Turji’s current accusations tap into a broader context of ethnic conflicts in Northern Nigeria. Some centuries ago, the areas that became Northwestern and Northcentral Nigeria were marked by conflict and dominance, with Hausa rule overturned by Uthman Dan Fodio’s 1804 jihad, leading to Fulani ascendancy. Despite intermarriages and an uneasy coexistence, banditry and cattle rustling became persistent issues. This never went away even after the British became the overlords of the area. By 2011, banditry had escalated into a national crisis from Zamfara, exacerbated by the breakdown of traditional dispute mechanisms, the corruption of the traditional ruler system, and diminished access to justice in the context of widespread arms availability and farmland destruction. The Fulani-Hausa clashes are often linked to disputes over land, resources and livestock, but the rhetoric of ethnic retribution in this case is particularly alarming. Turji’s explicit threats to wage war on the Hausa community create a dangerous narrative that could lead to further bloodshed, with potentially catastrophic consequences for both ethnic groups and the region as a whole. Fundamentally, Bello Turji’s threats highlight, once again, the issues of limited state capacity and the absence of political will that have long plagued the country’s ability to address insecurity, ethnic tensions and conflict. Several clashes between Fulanis and Hausas in the Northwest, the foremost of which appeared between 2022 and 2023 in Zamfara, went unaddressed by state governors, most of whom are Fulani. Successive Nigerian governments have failed to address the root causes of interethnic violence and terrorism, focusing more on managing crises than on long-term solutions to poverty, unemployment and resource competition. There is also no clear, sustainable and accountable plan for the teeming vigilante groups set up to augment the efforts of regular security forces. There is a reason to believe that Turji’s angst stems largely from extrajudicial killings carried out by vigilante groups locally known as Yan Sakai, but who are now formalised in the state system under various names such as the Katsina Security Watch Corps as well as the Community Protection Guards in Zamfara. While Bello Turji’s threat is credible, what is truly astonishing is the state’s inability to prevent the usurpation of its role as the primary arbiter of disputes among its people. However, considering Nigeria’s history with ungoverned spaces and the influence of non-state actors, this is not surprising.

The National Communications Commission (NCC) has granted Airtel Nigeria Telesonic Limited three licences to expand its fibre network and improve infrastructure to meet growing data services in Nigeria. The approved licences are National Long Distance, Internet Service Provider, and Sales & Installation Major. The National Long Distance licence, valid for 20 years, will allow the operator to establish and manage networks that facilitate long-distance communications within Nigeria, covering voice, data, and video services. On the other hand, the Internet Service Provider and Sales and Installation Major licences will be valid for five years.

While the issuance of these licences to Airtel Nigeria Telesonic Limited by the NCC is a positive step for infrastructure expansion, it is important to acknowledge the current challenges facing the telecommunications sector, particularly the poor network quality and the telecom companies’ ongoing push to increase tariffs for data and calls. The poor network service in Nigeria has been a persistent issue, often linked to inadequate infrastructure, maintenance challenges, and high operating costs, including power supply disruptions and vandalism. The expanded fibre network Airtel plans to deploy through the National Long Distance licence could alleviate some of these infrastructure deficiencies. By increasing network capacity, the fibre network expansion should help reduce congestion, improve service reliability, and enhance data speeds, especially in underserved and rural areas. However, achieving these improvements will depend on how quickly and efficiently Airtel can roll out this infrastructure. At the same time, telecom companies, including Airtel, have been advocating for tariff increases to compensate for rising operational costs, inflation and exchange rate fluctuations. While this is an understandable move from a business standpoint, any tariff hike would likely spark consumer concerns, particularly given the existing dissatisfaction with network quality. The challenge will be balancing the need for improved infrastructure and services with ensuring affordability for consumers. Given this context, Airtel’s new licences present an opportunity for the company to make a compelling case that its infrastructure investments will lead to tangible improvements in service quality, which could justify future price adjustments. However, the telco must ensure transparency in its rollout plans and engage in meaningful dialogue with the NCC and consumers to avoid perceptions of unjustified price hikes. The NCC’s role in regulating tariffs and monitoring service quality will be crucial in ensuring that the benefits of these licences translate into better service delivery rather than just higher costs for users.

The Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) plans to open Ghana’s new cocoa crop season on 10 September 2024, with a self-financing plan, while the government seeks external funding for the sector. COCOBOD’s target has been cut by 19.8% due to a dry spell, though efforts are underway to boost production by 200,000 metric tonnes over six years. Meanwhile, Ghana’s second-quarter 2024 revenue totalled GH¢74.65 billion, or 7.1% of GDP, falling short of the GH¢76.07 billion target. Tax revenue exceeded expectations, while non-tax revenue and other sources underperformed. Year-on-year revenue growth was 24.6%, driven by strong domestic and tax revenue performance.

Ghana’s cocoa sector has long been overseen by COCOBOD. While COCOBOD has provided stability and support for farmers, recent challenges are sparking debate over whether government control is now a hindrance. Government-set prices often leave farmers earning less than they could in a freer market. COCOBOD is acutely aware of its deteriorating creditworthiness in the international syndicated loan market. As a result, it pivoted to domestic self-financing as a survival strategy. The near collapse of Ghana’s forward cocoa sales last season sent a clear message: a significant risk premium will now be placed on Ghana’s cocoa beans for this season and subsequent ones. This is partly because the country failed to meet its contractual obligations to cocoa buyers, leaving trading houses with losses exceeding $1 billion on cocoa derivatives, as they were forced to liquidate short positions amidst a rallying market, where prices surged to $10,000 per ton. The driving factors behind this uncertainty are multifaceted. Bad weather, crop diseases, smuggling, and illegal mining continue to disrupt Ghana’s cocoa production. These same challenges, compounded by last season’s default, have led to a surge in risk perception among investors and international buyers. While COCOBOD initially projected $1.5 billion in external funding for this season, these recent developments mean Ghana may be priced out of the market due to the steep interest rates associated with the perceived risk. Historically, cocoa has been the backbone of Ghana’s economy, providing critical foreign exchange earnings that stabilise the cedi, particularly against the US dollar. However, this year’s performance has been grim. In the second quarter of 2024, total government revenue and grants saw a significant decline, primarily due to the poor performance of key tax handles and a marked reduction in cocoa inflows. Export earnings from cocoa plunged by nearly 48% in the first half of the year, compared to the same period in 2023. In dollar terms, this represented a shortfall of more than $690 million, severely weakening the cedi, which has lost over 20% of its value against the US dollar since the start of the year. Ghana’s dependence on cocoa exports is thus facing a critical juncture, as domestic production remains challenged and international market confidence falters. COCOBOD’s pivot to domestic financing may serve as a stopgap. However, failure to address the underlying production and export issues will jeopardise the cocoa sector’s future and the country’s broader economic stability. Loosening COCOBOD’s control could lead to better prices and greater autonomy for farmers given the growing consensus that a reform is needed to boost productivity, adapt to climate risks and increase benefits for farmers. Ghana must balance COCOBOD’s stabilising role with the need for market-driven growth to secure the future of its cocoa industry as it prepares for the 2024-2025 cocoa season.