Africa Watch – Changing the course

In a referendum on Saturday, voters in Gabon approved a new constitution with over 91% support, aiming to prevent dynastic rule and ensure peaceful transitions of power. This follows a 2023 coup that ousted Gabon’s longtime president. In Senegal, the ruling party, Pastef, claimed victory in parliamentary elections, securing a mandate for President Bassirou Diomaye Faye’s reform agenda. Opposition leaders, including former President Macky Sall, conceded defeat. Meanwhile, in Somaliland, opposition leader Abdirahman Cirro won 64% of the vote against incumbent President Muse Abdi, marking a leadership change in the self-declared independent region, which still lacks international recognition.

In our Africa Country Instability Risk Index (Aciri) published last week, Gabon saw an improvement in its ranking, falling from the 10th least stable country on the continent to 11th. Senegal went two better, falling from 26th least stable last year to 28th this year. This improvement in both countries is reflected in the positive direction in which they appear to be headed.

Gabon’s draft constitution imposes a seven-year term, renewable only once, instead of the current charter that allows for five-year terms, renewable without limit. It also hinders family members from succeeding a president and abolishes the position of prime minister. The last bit on preventing dynastic succession can be interpreted as targeting the Bongo family. Ali Bongo Ondimba took over from his father, who ruled Gabon for 41 years. He, in turn, had ruled for 14 years before his attempt at tenure extension through a questionable re-election victory drew people onto the streets and led to his ouster by the military in August 2023.

With this referendum and the pace with which the transition has moved, the junta has managed to avoid many pitfalls that have plagued unconstitutional government changes in Africa, some of which include delays in the pre-constitutional development phase that make them appear insincere and the infighting that characterises the transitional committee. This paves the way for Brice Oluigui Nguema’s likely participation in next year’s elections. The referendum’s legitimacy hinges on the transparency and inclusiveness of the process. While the high approval rate suggests broad support, sceptics might question whether voters were fully informed or the military-led government influenced the process. The true test will lie in the government’s commitment to uphold the constitution’s provisions and foster a genuinely democratic environment where opposition parties can thrive, and citizens feel their voices are heard. Gabon must navigate the transition carefully to avoid military entrenchment or elite capture of power under the guise of constitutionalism.

For Senegal, the parliamentary elections became necessary when the standoff between President Faye and parliament became untenable. Faye admitted in September that working with the assembly had grown difficult after members refused to start discussions on the budget law and rejected efforts to dissolve wasteful state institutions. Though the conduct was relatively peaceful, there were flashes of violence in its run-up, which served as a reminder of the political instability that trailed then-president Macky Sall’s government’s persecution of then-opposition leader (and now prime minister) Ousmane Sonko. Furthermore, several incidents of violence were reported during the election, which was foreshadowed by pre-election violence.

Despite the tensions, PASTEF emerged victorious, securing 131 of 165 National Assembly seats and winning 40 of 46 departments and seven of eight diaspora constituencies. This decisive win followed President Faye’s dissolution of the National Assembly and call for snap elections on 12 September after conflicts with the opposition-controlled legislature. This blowout—a development that the opposition, which led different coalitions to concede defeat to—provides Faye and Sonko with the majority they need to pass their reform agenda. In the period leading up to the February polls, both men ran a campaign that promised a clean break from the past, thus raising expectations of their administration. The parliamentary election results allow them to meet those expectations without excuses.

While Somaliland does not feature in the Aciri—it is not internationally recognised as a country by anyone just yet—the leadership change, with opposition leader Abdirahman Cirro defeating incumbent President Muse Abdi, demonstrates the region’s commitment to democratic principles. The elections, which took place some two years after it was originally scheduled, having been delayed due to a lack of funding, came against the backdrop of regional tensions following the statelet’s attempt at gaining international recognition through unilateral deals with Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates through port and naval deals.

Such deals have brought its parent state, Somalia, into a threat of direct war with Ethiopia. Mogadishu has allied with Egypt and sought security assistance from Turkiye in recent weeks. Although both candidates campaigned on other things, including working to get international recognition for Somaliland, the incoming government may be in the primary position to achieve significant success in that regard. There is a growing optimism that the incoming Trump administration may reconsider the US’s long-standing recognition of Mogadishu’s sovereignty over Somaliland. This development is largely fueled by statements from key US Department of State officials, who previously worked on Africa policy during Trump’s first term, expressing support for Somaliland’s independence.

Conducting credible elections in a de facto state with limited resources is an achievement that underscores Somaliland’s political maturity and its claim to democratic legitimacy. Cirro’s victory could inject new energy into Somaliland’s long-standing quest for international recognition. However, achieving this goal remains a formidable challenge. Without recognition, Somaliland continues to face severe limitations in accessing international finance, trade opportunities, and mobility for its six million residents. Cirro’s administration must balance its population’s aspirations with pragmatic strategies to engage global powers and regional neighbours.

Somaliland has been self-governing since 1991, boasting a democratic government, a free market economy, and relative stability despite being surrounded by volatile regions—in Aciri, its neighbours all score poorly, the best performing of the lot, Ethiopia, being rated as vulnerable. The statelet has maintained democratic governance and relative peace, contrasting with Somalia’s instability.

However, a major boon for the incoming Trump administration could be drawn from its Africa policy focused on a China Containment Strategy. Therefore, recognising Somaliland could provide a crucial counterbalance to China’s growing regional presence. Analysts at the Heritage Foundation have suggested that recognising Somaliland would be an act of justice, considering the Somaliland people’s consistent pursuit of independence. However, concerns remain about potential Chinese pressure on Somaliland to sever ties with Taiwan in exchange for UN recognition. While optimism is growing, it is essential to note that any decision on recognition would depend on various geopolitical factors and the Trump administration’s priorities. As such, this may not likely be top of the priority list of a second Trump Administration whose geopolitical priority is in East Asia and who would be loath to upset the balance of power in East Africa while risking chaos.