The week ahead – Wave of change

Simon Ekpa, the self-proclaimed leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), has been arrested in Finland alongside four others on suspicion of terrorist activities, including inciting crimes with terrorist intent and financing terrorism. He was arrested on 21 November. Ekpa, a dual citizen of Nigeria and Finland, has been accused of using his social media platforms to promote violence and separatist propaganda in southeastern Nigeria. According to Finnish authorities, Ekpa’s online rhetoric has fueled attacks on civilians and government forces in Nigeria, and his activities have been coordinated from Finland with international cooperation. This marks his second arrest in Finland.

It appears that the Finnish government’s decision to arrest Ekpa may have had to do with pressures from concerned stakeholders in Nigeria’s Southeast, where the bulk of the Kanu-inspired and Ekpa-dominated separatist agitation for the old Eastern Region has held sway. The current iteration of violence led by the militant Eastern Security Network began with the arrest and detention of IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu at the hands of Kenyan and Nigerian authorities in August 2021. Mr Kanu’s group instituted a weekly sit-at-home in the region to protest his detention–a directive they have had to forcefully implement given how their decline in popularity among the region’s residents in light of escalating violence by the group on not just government security forces but also on civilians, has led to the shutting down of business and social activities. On one hand, leaders in the region have ramped up pressure on the Tinubu administration to release Kanu to placate the violence. On the other hand–which is not so much at variance with the former–social media and the region’s leaders have also voiced concerns about Finland’s refusal to rein in Ekpa’s excesses. Mr Ekpa has been fingered as the staying power behind the violence despite the main IPOB group’s factionalisation. Ekpa leads the more hardline faction intent on using violence, a position which has alienated him from more moderate members such as Emma Powerful, among several others. Kanu himself, while speaking from detention, has condemned the violence, but that has not stopped Ekpa from receiving donations via online fundraising events–the proceeds which are in turn used to fund the violence unleashed by splinter factions such as the Biafra Liberation Army among others controlled by Ekpa. His latest arrest—he was arrested for suspected fraud in 2023—might be markedly different from the past. This time, his charges were formally announced, and accomplices were also announced as being at large. This indicates that the Finnish authorities have something to make it stick. Since he is a Finnish citizen, the chances of extradition to Nigeria are limited, mainly because the Nigerian government has never officially requested his arrest or extradition. One significant fallout of his arrest is that continuous detention may starve the group of much-needed funds for operations. However, the chances that the violence in the Southeast will abate immediately appear small because, to all intents and purposes, no one person has all the levers of control over the armed groups operating in the region. For groups that can exist outside of the IPOB funding bubble, other avenues to create lifeblood, such as kidnap for ransom and gun-running, are actual channels which the Nigerian security forces are yet to rein in.

Nuhu Ribadu, Nigeria’s National Security Adviser, visited Chad’s President Idriss Déby to enhance security cooperation in the Lake Chad basin. Ribadu, accompanied by top military officials, delivered a message from President Bola Tinubu and discussed joint operations against jihadist groups. Ribadu described the talks as “fruitful,” reaffirming Nigeria’s commitment to working with Chad. Meanwhile, in Nigeria’s Zamfara State, terrorists killed five residents in Dayau village, burning houses, shops, and food silos. After more than an hour of initial confrontation with local vigilantes and members of the Community Protection Guards, the attackers withdrew but returned hours later to carry out their deadly assault, taking the community off guard.

Mr Ribadu’s visit to Chad is a long overdue meeting, especially when the mounting regional security challenges are put in focus. Despite the public commitments to strengthening regional cooperation against the challenges posed by non-state actors, it appears that the more things changed, the more they stayed the same. What prompted this particular visit by Ribadu and other security chiefs was the Islamic State West Africa Province’s attack on Chadian forces on 27 October, which led to the death of no fewer than 40 soldiers on the border with Nigeria. In two ways, the circumstances surrounding that incident and the succeeding events closely resemble what happened in March 2020 when Boko Haram killed more than 100 Chadian soldiers in a surprise attack at the Bohoma islet of Lake Chad. In both instances, poor coordination and complacency under the regional Multinational Joint Taskforce allowed Boko Haram’s presence in Southern Chad to grow large enough to take on an entire battalion successfully. In both cases, the Chadian government responded forcefully, claiming to kill hundreds (or thousands, as in the first instance) of Boko Haram militants. Finally, in both cases, counterterrorism efforts were personally led by the head of state, who threatened to leave the Multinational Joint Taskforce. Although it is pretty early to tell if Mahmat Kaka Deby will hold firm on his threat to pull Chad out of the MNJTF, what the current experience has in future projection to the former is that the severed cooperation in whatever form will be a spectacular gift for ISWAP and the Bakura-led JAS faction, who would take advantage of the cooperation breakdown between the Lake Chad Basin Countries to reclaim the Lake Chad Islands that ISWAP drove them out of. With this visit, it appears that this is a reality the Nigerian side understands, but its history of not taking it with the deserved seriousness tells a different story. Idris Deby’s decision to end Chadian participation in the MNJTF was due to his frustration with Nigeria for failing to maximise the gains it made in its 2015/2016 offensive, having lost grounds that made ISWAP regroup into a formidable outfit from 2018. That negligence is responsible for its expansion away from the North East and into the North West, where its cells have been found in the Gummi and Gusau areas of Zamfara. As such, the latest attack on Kaura Namoda could have been carried out by them or any of the other armed Islamist groups trying to gain a foothold in Zamfara. The fact that the attackers were able to attack for seven hours unimpeded indicates a few things, one of them being that the cross-security service coordination spearheaded by the army, using the police, state-backed vigilante groups, and local self-help organisations is barely existent enough to put up a challenge. This is possible because the rivalry between the incumbent governor and his predecessor, the current junior defence minister, affects military operations in the state. Finally, the struggles with security in rural areas of the state are here to stay. Increased coordination, which has been the centre point of this piece, can bring insecurity in these areas to a heel. However, it is not likely to be found in the short term.

President Bola Tinubu has advised candidates defeated in the 2024 Ondo State governorship election to seek legal redress if dissatisfied with the outcome of the polls. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) declared Lucky Aiyedatiwa, the incumbent governor and the All Progressives Congress (APC) candidate, the winner with 366,781 votes. According to INEC, he defeated the former deputy governor, PDP’s Agboola Ajayi, who received 117,845 votes. Aiyedatiwa won in all 18 local government areas of the state. Tinubu’s spokesperson, Bayo Onanuga, said that those unhappy with the election outcome could use the judicial system to seek redress in any conflict areas.

For more than a decade, Nigeria’s electoral system has grappled with significant challenges, with the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) often under scrutiny for its inability to conduct elections deemed free, fair, and credible by a broad consensus. Electoral malpractices, ranging from voter suppression and intimidation to ballot box snatching and result manipulation, have become endemic features of the country’s democratic process. These issues have eroded public trust in the electoral system and shifted the battle for political legitimacy from the ballot box to the courtroom. The increasing recourse to the judiciary as the final arbiter in electoral disputes highlights a disturbing trend. Politicians, often dissatisfied with the outcome of elections, have turned to the courts to reclaim or retain power. This has raised questions about the judiciary’s capacity to remain impartial and resist external pressures in adjudicating these politically charged cases. The election tribunal’s decision to uphold President Tinubu’s victory in the 2023 presidential election is a notable example of this phenomenon. While the tribunal’s ruling reaffirmed Mr Tinubu’s election, it also reignited debates about the effectiveness of Nigeria’s legal and electoral frameworks in resolving disputes and ensuring electoral integrity. In the case of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the losses in the Edo and Ondo state governorship elections further underscore the challenges opposition parties face in navigating the current political landscape. While the courts remain an option for contesting these results, history suggests that overturning election outcomes through legal channels is a long shot. Nigerian courts have traditionally been reluctant to annul elections unless substantial evidence of widespread irregularities is presented—a high threshold that often leaves aggrieved parties disillusioned. President Tinubu’s remarks amid the tribunal’s verdict reflect a broader reality of Nigerian politics: the courtroom is increasingly seen as an extension of the political arena. While the judiciary has played a critical role in upholding democratic principles in some instances, the over-reliance on legal interventions risks undermining the sanctity of the electoral process. For many, this trend signals a worrying shift away from elections as the primary mechanism for choosing leaders, further complicating Nigeria’s journey toward a more robust and accountable democracy. Ultimately, resolving Nigeria’s electoral challenges requires comprehensive reforms. Strengthening INEC’s capacity to conduct credible polls, ensuring greater transparency in electoral processes, and addressing systemic issues such as vote-buying and voter intimidation are crucial. Without these changes, the cycle of contested elections and legal battles will persist, with profound implications for the stability and credibility of Nigeria’s democracy.

Ghana National Gas Company saved $250 million by replacing Sinopec engineers with a Ghanaian team under its indigenisation strategy, creating about 1,000 jobs and enhancing operational efficiency. CEO Dr Ben Asante highlighted milestones since 2017, including three major maintenance projects. Meanwhile, Ghana’s National Pensions Regulatory Authority (NPRA) has restricted private pension fund managers from investing in offshore assets, citing concerns over cedi pressure. Fund managers, holding $5 million in offshore assets, expressed frustration over unclear legal grounds for the restrictions. NPRA head John Kwaning Mbroh stated offshore investments require government approval, denying resistance to such investments.

Ghana Gas’s decision to fully indigenise its operations has proven to be a significant milestone in the country’s pursuit of economic self-reliance. By replacing Sinopec engineers with a local team, the company has saved $250 million—a remarkable achievement that underscores the potential of homegrown expertise. Beyond the cost savings, the indigenisation strategy has created approximately 1,000 jobs, spanning permanent and contract roles, and helped develop technical skills in the energy sector. This move has not only fostered operational efficiency but also aligned with broader national goals of reducing dependency on foreign expertise. The successful execution of three major maintenance projects by the Ghanaian team further highlights the viability of such an approach. However, sustaining these gains will require ongoing investments in training and technology to ensure local professionals remain competitive in a rapidly evolving energy landscape. Ghana is steadily establishing itself as a leader in promoting local content in the oil and gas sector within West Africa. With approximately 64% of Ghana’s electricity mix reliant on thermal sources, an affordable and reliable gas supply is crucial for energy security and economic growth. Beyond Ghana Gas, the rise of Springfield Exploration and Production, the nation’s first wholly indigenous oil company, showcases the potential of local expertise in the upstream sector. Springfield’s groundbreaking discovery in 2019 of over 1.5 billion barrels of oil and 0.7 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in the West Cape Three Points Block 2 demonstrates the competitiveness of Ghanaian firms in exploration and production. The broader impact of this shift extends beyond Ghana Gas. It serves as an example of how local capacity building can drive economic transformation. The strategy dovetails with initiatives like the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), emphasising regional integration and homegrown solutions to developmental challenges. The regional collaboration further enhances these efforts, as seen in Ghana’s adoption of Dangote fuel, produced by Nigeria’s Dangote Refinery, reinforcing economic resilience within the ECOWAS bloc. While local content strategies have yielded impressive results, challenges persist. Regulatory actions, such as restrictions on offshore pension fund investments to stabilise the cedi, underscore the delicate balance between fostering domestic growth and maintaining macroeconomic stability. By restricting new offshore investments, regulators aim to reduce capital flight and encourage using pension funds to support domestic economic growth. While this policy has some merits, it has also sparked tensions with fund managers, who argue that there is no clear legal basis for the restrictions. The lack of regulatory clarity risks undermining investor confidence, especially as fund managers seek to diversify their portfolios and protect pensioners from domestic financial risks. This move by the National Pensions Regulatory Authority (NPRA) underscores a broader dilemma: balancing the need for macroeconomic stability with the flexibility required for optimal investment strategies. Limiting offshore investments may protect the cedi in the short term, but it could expose pension funds to higher risks if domestic economic conditions worsen. Additionally, forcing funds to concentrate investments locally could limit returns, especially in a volatile economic environment. The success of Ghana Gas’s indigenisation strategy illustrates how localising value creation can reduce costs, create jobs, and build resilience. Conversely, the challenges private pension fund managers face reveal the complexities of protecting the local economy while maintaining investment flexibility. As Ghana navigates these competing priorities, clear and cohesive policies will be critical to sustaining economic growth and fostering investor confidence. Both cases underscore the importance of capacity building, transparency, and a balanced approach to economic self-reliance.