The week ahead – Bridges to nowhere

Former Kaduna Governor Nasir El-Rufai has severed ties with his successor, Uba Sani, accusing him of betrayal and colluding with NSA Nuhu Ribadu to tarnish his image. In an Arise TV interview, El-Rufai denied allegations of misappropriating ₦400 billion, citing EFCC and ICPC investigations clearing him. Ribadu dismissed the claims, focusing on national duties and denying any 2031 presidential ambition. El-Rufai hinted at leaving the APC and revealed that President Tinubu withdrew his cabinet nomination. The Kaduna Assembly maintains allegations of financial mismanagement against his administration, but El-Rufai insists he is innocent.

This development highlights the deepening rift between former Kaduna State Governor Nasir El-Rufai and his successor, Uba Sani. Given Mr El-Rufai’s pivotal role in Sani’s political rise, their fallout underscores the often-unstable nature of political alliances in Nigeria. The accusations of betrayal suggest an internal power struggle within the Kaduna chapter of the All Progressives Congress (APC), with potential repercussions for state politics. El-Rufai’s claim that National Security Adviser Nuhu Ribadu is using Sani to tarnish his reputation points to a broader power play at the federal level. However, Ribadu’s dismissal of these claims and his focus on national security indicate an attempt to avoid being drawn into political infighting. President Bola Tinubu’s withdrawal of El-Rufai’s ministerial nomination and his suggestion that he might leave the APC raise questions about his standing within the ruling party. The allegations of financial mismanagement, with the Kaduna State House of Assembly claiming that ₦400 billion was misappropriated during his governorship, add to the controversy. While he insists on his innocence, citing past investigations by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), Nigeria’s history of corruption allegations against political figures means that public perception will be shaped by any further inquiries. This situation could have lasting consequences for Kaduna State politics, the APC’s cohesion, and El-Rufai’s political future. If El-Rufai does leave the APC, it could trigger a realignment of political forces ahead of the 2027 general elections. Notably, El-Rufai reserved his harshest criticisms for Uba Sani, his former protégé, and Ribadu, his erstwhile ally, while keeping the door open for reconciliation with President Tinubu. His recent engagements with opposition figures like Atiku Abubakar and Bukola Saraki suggest that a new political force may soon emerge. However, this is unlikely to be the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), given the party’s internal instability, exacerbated by the disruptive influence of Nyesom Wike. As projected in our annual forcast, elements from the APC, PDP, and other sidelined politicians under Tinubu’s administration are likely to coalesce into a new political party that will mount a challenge in 2027. However, we do not foresee El-Rufai leading that ticket—at most, he may position himself as a deputy. Such a move would imply a Southern presidency, a prospect that northern political strategists may resist, given that it could extend southern rule to 12 consecutive years. As a result, we anticipate that any 2027 challenge to Tinubu’s presidency, if led by a southerner, will be largely symbolic. The real contest for power will likely take place in the 2031 elections.

Nigeria is set to conduct its first national population and housing census in 19 years, incorporating biometric and digital technology. President Bola Tinubu met with the National Population Commission (NPC) to stress the importance of accurate data for planning in employment, agriculture, and food security. He pledged to form a committee to align the census budget with economic realities and emphasised biometric capturing. NPC Chairman Nasir Isa Kwarra noted that the 2006 census is outdated, and 760,000 tablets have been acquired for the exercise. Minister Abubakar Atiku Bagudu highlighted the census’s role in resource distribution and future planning.

Nigeria’s upcoming census represents a significant modernisation effort, transitioning to biometric and digital data collection for improved accuracy. With the last census in 2006, an update is critical given the country’s rapid population growth and urbanisation. President Tinubu’s focus on biometric data aims to reduce fraud and enhance demographic reliability. However, his remarks about aligning the census budget with “economic realities” suggest potential funding limitations. Conducting a digital census during economic strain poses challenges, especially considering Nigeria’s history of logistical hurdles in large-scale projects. The government’s procurement of 760,000 tablets demonstrates a commitment to modernisation, but success depends on thorough training, reliable network infrastructure, and robust security to prevent data manipulation. A well-executed census could transform policy planning across sectors like employment, agriculture, and resource allocation. Conversely, mismanagement could result in another expensive, inconclusive exercise, worsening existing governance issues. Nigeria’s reliance on outdated and often disputed population estimates has impeded effective policy decisions in areas such as employment, infrastructure, and food security. With an estimated population exceeding 200 million, accurate data is essential for addressing these challenges. Past censuses have been plagued by political and logistical problems, including allegations of manipulation driven by ethnic and regional interests. Biometric technology, such as facial and voice recognition, can mitigate fraud and duplication, enhancing credibility. However, concerns about data security, funding constraints, and logistical execution remain. Successful digital censuses in other African countries, like Kenya and South Africa, demonstrate the feasibility of this approach. If Nigeria effectively implements its digital census, it could establish a new standard for transparent and reliable population data collection, enabling more informed national planning.

The Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority (NMDPRA) has banned 60,000-litre fuel tankers from operating on roads from March 1 to reduce truck-in-transit incidents. Meanwhile, petroleum tanker drivers and marketers are threatening a nationwide strike over ₦100 billion in unpaid debts and alleged harassment by government agencies. The Petroleum Tanker Drivers branch of NUPENG has already begun an indefinite strike, citing police harassment in Lagos. The strike is disrupting essential services, with telecom operators warning of potential service outages due to diesel supply shortages. Fuel marketers have also threatened to withdraw services if debts remain unpaid.

The proposed outright ban on fuel tankers of any size, without first establishing alternative infrastructure, is a short-sighted policy that risks exacerbating fuel scarcity rather than addressing the root causes of road accidents. This reflects a recurring pattern of regulatory overreach in Nigeria, where policy decisions are often made without fully considering their far-reaching implications. Such a ban is not only unenforceable but is also likely to create another avenue for law enforcement officers to exploit for bribes, the cost of which will ultimately be passed on to consumers. Nigeria has over 5,000 km of installed pipeline infrastructure designed for transporting refined petroleum products across the country. However, much of this network has been abandoned and left in a state of disrepair. As a result, large fuel tankers have become the primary means of moving petroleum products, posing significant risks to lives and property. The Group Chief Executive Officer of the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC), Mele Kyari, announced nearly a year ago that the entire pipeline network would be replaced within three years. However, little concrete progress or detailed plans have been disclosed since. Any attempt to phase out fuel tankers will undoubtedly face resistance from tanker owners and drivers who have benefited from the inefficiencies of the current system. Banning 60,000-litre tankers does not address the fundamental causes of road accidents, as even smaller fuel tankers can pose significant risks. Many drivers lack proper training and frequently drive recklessly, contributing to accidents. Furthermore, the poor state of Nigeria’s road infrastructure, riddled with potholes, remains a major contributing factor to accidents. Additionally, many of the trailer heads used to transport these tankers are not designed to carry 60,000-litre loads, often resulting in instability where the weight of the tanker body exceeds that of the head, increasing the likelihood of accidents. A more pragmatic approach would involve structured interventions aimed at addressing these systemic issues. Driver training programmes should be mandated to ensure that only qualified personnel operate heavy-duty tankers. Simultaneously, regulatory oversight must be strengthened to enforce proper vehicle maintenance standards, ensuring that tanker bodies are securely attached to their trailer heads. Furthermore, policymakers should explore alternative fuel transportation methods to reduce the dependence on road networks. One viable option is the strategic deployment of fuel depots and tank farms in key locations such as Onitsha and Warri. Instead of transporting fuel across long distances by road from Lagos, fuel could be conveyed to these tank farms using coastal vessels. From these depots, fuel could then be distributed via smaller, safer tanker trucks to filling stations, significantly reducing the risks associated with long-haul road transportation. Heavy-duty vehicles are not exclusive to petroleum transport; container trucks also contribute to road safety concerns. It is common practice in Nigeria for trailer heads designed for 20-foot containers to be used to transport 40-foot containers, which is an unsafe practice. Addressing these structural challenges requires a comprehensive regulatory framework that goes beyond simply banning certain tanker sizes. Rather than implementing a blanket ban, the government should collaborate with the Ministry of Transportation and industry stakeholders to develop sustainable alternatives. The economic rationale behind the 60,000-litre tankers should also be considered—marketers adopted this model to reduce costs and improve efficiency by consolidating two trips into one. A ban on these tankers would likely drive up transportation costs, leading to fuel shortages and increased pump prices. This would disproportionately affect consumers and businesses, further straining an already fragile economy. A well-thought-out fuel transportation policy should prioritise investment in pipeline rehabilitation, coastal fuel logistics, road infrastructure improvements, and stringent safety regulations. Only by addressing these core issues can Nigeria achieve a safer, more efficient fuel distribution system without creating unnecessary economic disruptions. The government must also ensure that any policy changes are accompanied by clear timelines, transparent implementation plans, and stakeholder engagement to avoid unintended consequences. While the intention to improve road safety and reduce accidents involving fuel tankers is commendable, a blanket ban without viable alternatives is not the solution. Nigeria needs a holistic approach that addresses the root causes of the problem, including infrastructure deficits, regulatory gaps, and driver training. By focusing on sustainable solutions, the country can achieve a safer and more efficient fuel distribution system that benefits all stakeholders.

Ghana’s Trades Union Congress (TUC) is urging President John Dramani Mahama to halt the mass termination of public sector appointments, warning that it could devastate young Ghanaians, jeopardise livelihoods, undermine young citizens’ patriotism, and damage the country’s democratic reputation. The TUC criticised the revocation of appointments, particularly affecting teachers, nurses, and other professionals who have spent years pursuing education and struggling to secure employment. The TUC’s concerns follow a directive issued by the Chief of Staff, Julius Debrah, on 10 February 2025, instructing all government institutions to revoke appointments made after 7 December 2024.

It’s become a regrettable feature of Ghanaian democracy that incoming administrations often engage in widespread dismissals and recruitment freezes.  Appointments made shortly before or after elections are frequently perceived as politically motivated, leading subsequent governments to terminate those positions. While this pattern is familiar, the current situation is notable for the sheer scale of the dismissals, impacting public sector workers across vital areas like education and healthcare. This has prompted legal challenges from affected groups, who are pursuing claims of wrongful termination. Although the precise number of public sector workers affected remains unclear, chatter indicates that President Mahama’s administration has implemented these terminations on an unprecedented level.  Beyond the legal ramifications, there’s a fiscal dimension to consider.  Analysts of Ghana’s public sector wage bill suggest these dismissals could alleviate the government’s escalating compensation costs.  The International Monetary Fund (IMF), supporting Ghana with a $3 billion Extended Credit Facility (ECF) programme, projects that public sector wages and related remuneration will consume over 35% of the country’s projected revenue in 2025, and more than 50% of tax revenue. With the Mahama administration due to present its first budget in the second week of March, attention is focused on the compensation budget, which is projected to reach $4.7 billion. This figure surpasses the entire three-year IMF bailout package.  Therefore, it will be crucial to observe how the government incorporates any potential savings from these terminations into the upcoming budget statement.