Report on Small Arms, Mass Atrocities & Migration in Nigeria

APRIL 2020
DISCLAIMER

The data contained in this report is only up-to-date as at Friday, 20 March 2020. Some of it is subject to change during the natural course of events. SB Morgen cannot accept liability in respect of any errors or omissions that may follow such events that may invalidate data contained herein.

Our researchers employed methods such as one-on-one interviews, desk research and polling to collate the available data. Our editors sifted through the data and prepared the report, using various proprietary tools to fact-check and copy edit the information gathered.

Our publicly released reports are formatted for easy and quick reading, and may not necessarily contain all the data that SB Morgen gathered during a given survey. Complete datasets can be made available on request.

All forecasts were built using data from a variety of sources. A baseline of accurate and comprehensive historic data is collected from respondents and publicly-available information, including from regulators, trade associations, research partners, newspapers and government agencies.

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# TABLE OF ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYM</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CFR</td>
<td>Council for Foreign Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DICON</td>
<td>Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEND</td>
<td>Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOSOP</td>
<td>Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDA</td>
<td>Niger Delta Avengers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDSF</td>
<td>Niger Delta Strike Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDVF</td>
<td>Niger Delta Volunteer Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSALWS</td>
<td>National Small Arms and Light Weapons Survey</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUND

The thrust of this report is a survey of the movement of small arms and the relationship of this movement with mass atrocities and migration within Nigeria. These are interconnected concepts as the proliferation of small arms drives mass atrocities which triggers the movement of people within Nigeria.

The report is divided into three sections, the first section/chapter deals with Southern Nigeria, focusing on the small arms proliferation and mass atrocities in that region. The second section/chapter addresses the same topic for Northern Nigeria, while the final section presents a general overview of migration within Nigeria with a focus on internal displacement.

1.2. METHODOLOGY

The first two sections were put together based on secondary sources of data such as newspapers, research papers, reports, etc. The focus here was not an exhaustive review of all available literature, but providing enough information and analysis to present a relevant picture of the topics under discussion.

Some of the major research questions are:

- What proportion of locally manufactured weapons are in use?
- What proportion of imported weapons are in use?
- What are the major points of entry for imported weapons?
- Who are the main suppliers and buyers of these arms, and what are the price ranges?
- What are the major internal hubs, such as storage locations, transhipment points, distribution methods/ channels?

The final section of the report was based on qualitative field research to ascertain the public perceptions on proliferation of small arms and light weapons, mass atrocities.
and refugees in Nigeria. This survey was conducted across the federating states of Nigeria including the FCT.

1.3. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

SOUTHERN NIGERIA

The proliferation of arms in Southern Nigeria has driven the increasing rate of violence in the region.

- This includes, but is not limited to; communal clashes, cultism (Nigerian speak for gang violence), kidnappings, ethnic and religious clashes, and militancy in the Niger Delta.
- In the Niger Delta region, a proliferation of small arms has had an impact on violent agitations by the various armed groups in the region demanding for greater control of the resources of the region.
- An amnesty programme initiated in 2009 by the late President Umaru Yar’adua aimed to deal with these agitations. It largely succeeded in restoring oil production levels, but the underlying economic injustices that drove the agitation in the Niger Delta are yet to be resolved.
- A toxic mix of small arms proliferation, youth under/unemployment and general disaffection is likely to drive future agitation.
- Southern Nigeria has an established local arms manufacturing sector and there is also significant importation/smuggling from international sources.
- Illegal weapons factories have also been discovered in towns such as Enugu and Calabar. It is difficult to estimate the volume of locally manufactured weapons produced in this region.
- There are many different points of entry for internationally sourced weapons. East European and Asian nations are the major sources of illegal arms in Southern Nigeria.
- An important mass killing in Southern Nigeria, the Odi Massacre (1999) is also discussed.
The North Central accounts for some of the highest levels of violence involving communal groups, with communal militias accounting for over 40% of political violence according to reports.

NORTHERN NIGERIA

A combination of proliferation of small weapons, already existing state corruption, large tracts of ungoverned spaces, and mass unemployment has largely been responsible for the rising criminality and violence in Northern Nigeria.

Economics has also played a role. In the Northern Central region, there have been tensions between sedentary farmers and nomadic Fulani herders who are increasingly moving southwards due to climate change pressures to access pastureland. These tensions have led to armed confrontations, mass killings and displacement of some farming communities. There have also been cases of cattle rustling by armed groups, leading to violent clashes between rustlers and Fulani herders.

Apart from violent confrontation between Fulani herders and local farming communities, the North Central zone is rife with ethnic militias, making it a hotbed for violent ethnic and religious clashes facilitated using small arms. This geopolitical zone accounts for some of the highest levels of violence involving communal groups, with communal militias accounting for over 40% of political violence according to reports.

Small arms proliferation and related violence in North Eastern Nigeria is significantly different from what obtains in the North Central and North Western zones. Here, the primary driver of violence are radical Islamist groups attempting to carve a sphere of influence or an Islamic Caliphate. The Boko Haram terrorist group operates within this axis.
Locally manufactured arms, which are normally fabricated in small-scale factories, without legal permits, contribute to a large percentage of arms in circulation in Northern Nigeria (especially in North Central Nigeria,) according to preliminary findings from the National Small Arms and Light Weapons Survey (NSALWS).

- About a fifth (17 percent) of civilian, rural weapon-holders countrywide possess craft weapons, and a tenth reside in urban areas.
- In Benue and Plateau states, both in the North Central region, locally made weapons are estimated to be used in over 50% of crimes committed. (62% for Benue State, and 69% for Plateau State. In Adamawa State in the North East, it is 32%).
- There are many different points of entry for internationally sourced weapons. Nigeria’s porous borders facilitate the sourcing of weapons from countries bordering Northern Nigeria such as Chad and Niger (who are also dealing with their own Islamist Insurgencies).
- There are challenges documenting the flow of small arms into Nigeria, but analysis reveals that some weapons originate from Ivorian and Libyan military stockpiles.
- Ammunition from at least 21 different nations have been used in the Herder versus Farmer conflicts in North Central Nigeria (some of these nations include Israel, Poland, Brazil, Iran, USA, Czech Republic, Algeria and Egypt).
- According to research by Freedom Onuoha of the University of Nigeria, Nigerian security agencies have intercepted arms in Bakassi, Southern Nigeria, intended for delivery to Boko Haram.

Significant mass atrocities in Northern Nigeria like.

- Zaki Biam, Benue State (October 2001)
- Kuru Karama and Dogon na Hawa, Plateau State (January and March 2010)
- Mambilla, Taraba State (April 2014)
- Zaria, Kaduna State (December 2015)

Are further discussed.
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

Nigeria, with a total population of 2.2 million Internally displaced persons, ranks ninth from a list of the top 10 countries with IDPs in the world.

By the end of 2018, a report written by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre put the figure of internally displaced persons in Nigeria at about 2.2 million people. The report states that in 2018 alone, 541,000 were displaced.

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Boko Haram insurgency has displaced over 2 million people in the Lake Chad Basin area.

The drivers of mass displacement include; generalised violence, violations of human rights, high rate of insecurity, mostly in the Northern part of the country; Boko Haram attacks, the continuous Fulani herdsmen and Farmers crisis which has spread across the six geopolitical zones in the country; communal crisis with the locals in Benue, Nasarawa, Kaduna, Plateau, and Taraba states respectively, and in Ogoja in Cross River State which borders Ebonyi State and Cameroon.

SBM Intelligence also confirmed other reasons for the extremely high numbers of IDPs in Nigeria to include, natural or human-made disasters (such as floods) and in most cases, scarcity of resources. IDPs live within the local populations but are pressured to flee their homes and in some instances, to seek refuge in border countries.

SBM carried out a qualitative field research to ascertain the public perceptions on proliferation of small arms and light weapons, mass atrocities and refugees in Nigeria. The survey was conducted in Nigeria’s 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). Further details are in the body of this report.
2. SOUTHERN NIGERIA

2.1. ARMS IN SOUTHERN NIGERIA

2.1.1. INTRODUCTION

The term Southern Nigeria is a holdover from the Colony of Southern Nigeria, one of the two colonies that constituted the Colony of Nigeria at the amalgamation of North and South Nigeria in 1914 to form a single British colony.

Southern Nigeria consists of three geopolitical zones; the South West, which is dominated by the Yoruba ethnic group, the South East, which is dominated by the Igbo ethnic group and the ethnically diverse South South Region. A map of Southern Nigeria and its geopolitical regions with respect to the rest of Nigeria is shown below:

Ethnic nationalities in the heterogenous South South Region include, but are not limited to, the Andoni, Awori, Bekwara, Boki, Edo, Efik, Engenni, Esan, Etsako, Ibibio, Ijaw, Ilaje, Isoko, Ogoni, and Urhobo.
The term Niger Delta has evolved to include mainly oil-producing communities in Southern Nigeria. It cuts across all the three geopolitical regions in Southern Nigeria and includes the following states: Abia, Imo (SE), Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, Edo, Rivers (SS), and Ondo (SW) states.

The heterogeneous nature of Southern Nigeria, coupled with the rampant corruption, unemployment, inequality and general underdevelopment, has made it a volatile region and a hotspot of armed violence since the 1990s.

2.1.2. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE

The objective of this section of the report is to study small arms proliferation in Southern Nigeria with a view to enabling a fact-based linkage to mass atrocities. Some of the major research questions are:

- What proportion of locally manufactured weapons are in use?
- What proportion of imported weapons are in use?
- What are the major points of entry for imported weapons?
- Who are the main suppliers and buyers of these arms, and what are the price ranges?
- What are the major internal hubs, such as; storage locations, transhipment points, distribution methods/channels?

2.1.3. BACKGROUND

Arms proliferation is a major problem for governments and citizens who are concerned about its devastating impact on internal security.

- According to research carried out in 2017, it is estimated that there are more than 1 billion small arms in circulation globally.
- Out of that number, **87.5% or 875 million** of those arms are in the hands of civilians, while law enforcement agencies around the world account for a meagre **2%** of that total.
According to the Small Arms Survey of 2018, there are over 40,009,000 small arms in the hands of civilians or non-state actors in Africa, with 10,972,000 of that number concentrated in the West African sub region where Nigeria is the dominant power and most populous state.

The number of small arms in circulation in Nigeria, in the hands of civilian non-state actors is estimated at 6,145,000, while the armed forces and law enforcement collectively account for 586,600 firearms.

This worrying trend of arms proliferation in Nigeria has had an impact on Nigeria's internal security, with various armed groups using their access to firearms to challenge the state's monopoly of violence and lead to the deaths and injury of thousands of innocent citizens.

This has negatively impacted Nigeria's internal security and international standing, as Nigeria is now designated the third most impacted nation by terrorism, according to recent reports, and in the unenviable company of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.

The proliferation of small weapons in Southern Nigeria combined with already existing state corruption and mass unemployment has contributed to the rising criminality and violence in the region.

Towards the end of the Abacha Regime in 1998, armed robbery had begun to stifle commercial activities in Aba, a commercial centre in South East Nigeria. This drove some traders to organise vigilante groups to protect themselves and their businesses.

This initiative which later evolved into the Bakassi Boys eventually spread to other South Eastern states such as Anambra and Imo state which at the time had serious crime problems.

South Eastern Nigeria is known for entrepreneurship and the general poor security situation facilitated a trade in small arms in major markets such as the Ariaria Market in Aba and the Onitsha Main Market in Anambra State.

The relative lack of economic activity in South Western Nigeria outside Lagos has resulted in high youth unemployment and resultant violence and arms proliferation.
This has helped fuel inter-ethnic violence and violent land disputes. Notable examples include:

- Arogbo-Ijaw and Ilaje in Ondo state,
- Ife and Modakeke in Osun state,
- Saki-Iseyin and Hausa-Fulani in Oyo state

In Lagos State, Nigeria’s economic capital, there have been frequent gang clashes and inter-ethnic clashes between indigenous Yoruba traders, and settler Hausa traders.

Violence in the Niger Delta is compounded by a combination of grievances at a history of exploitation of crude oil and natural gas reserves, which denied host communities a fair share of their resources; militancy linked to the natural resource control struggle; a history of inter-ethnic and cult violence and small arms proliferation.

The most far reaching effect of arms proliferation in the region is the rise of militancy which evolved to include destruction of oil pipelines and the kidnap of oil workers, at some points, threatening to bring Nigeria’s economy to a standstill.

Arms proliferation enabled the rise of armed groups such as the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), the Niger Delta Strike Force (NDSF), the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and most recently, the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA). All these contribute to continued insecurity in the Niger Delta.

A 2019 SBM intelligence security report on Nigeria established that the Nigerian military was active in all of Nigeria’s states but Kebbi. The small arms-enabled crimes being dealt by the military in those states, ranged from issues such as kidnapping, pipeline vandalism, illegal oil bunkering, to herder-farmer violence, and natural resource-driven militancy.
For years, following the increasing spate of insecurity across the federation, the Nigerian military has been actively involved in one operation or another is no less than 35 status in the federation.

### Insecurity Categorisation

- **Banditry**

### Military Operations (Exercise & Region)

- **Tsafan Daji**
  - North West
  - Sokoto, Kaduna, Zamfara

- **Sharan Daji**
  - North West
  - Sokoto, Kaduna, Zamfara

- **Insecurity Categorisation**
  - Banditry

### Airforce Operations (Exercise & Region)

- **Ayem Akpatuma II**
  - North Central and parts of North Western states
  - Benue, Nasarawa, Kogi, Taraba, Kaduna, Niger

- **Egwu Eke IV**
  - South Eastern States
  - Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, Imo

- **Crocodile Smile IV**
  - South-south and parts of South Western states
  - Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Rivers, Edo, Lagos, Ogun

- **Lafiya Dole**
  - North East
  - Adamawa, Borno, Gombe, Yobe

### EXPLANATION

- **Egwu Eke IV**
  - 5 STATES WITH OPERATION EGWU EKE IV EXERCISE

- **No Military Exercise**
  - 1 STATE PLUS ABUJA WITH NO MILITARY EXERCISE

- **Lafiya Dole**
  - 4 STATES WITH OPERATION LAFIYA DOLE EXERCISE

- **Crocodile Smile IV**
  - 12 STATES WITH OPERATION CROCODILE SMILE IV

- **Ayem Akpatuma II**
  - 13 STATES WITH OPERATION AYEM AKPATUMA II EXERCISE

- **N/A**
  - BAUCHI STATES HAS MILITARY PRESENCE BUT WITH NO EXERCISE IN PARTICULAR
2.1.4. THE NIGER DELTA

2.1.4.1. OVERVIEW

The Niger Delta is one of the world’s most extensive wetland ecosystems, covering an area of 70,000 square kilometres. The map below illustrates the geographical extent of the Niger Delta.

The Niger Delta is also the site of what is probably Africa’s worst environmental disaster, with pollution from uncontrolled gas flaring, illegal oil refineries, sabotage of oil and gas installations, the seepage of hydrocarbons into the groundwater supply, and acid rain, all being pronounced health hazards.

According to the 2006 Nigerian Census, the total population of the Niger Delta Region was 30 million. Current estimates are significantly higher.
Key milestones in the history of the Niger Delta are as outlined in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>MILESTONE (DESCRIPTIONS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1900s</td>
<td>The Niger Delta was part of West Africa’s “Slave Coast”. Major slave trading houses were established in places like Bonny and Calabar. Slaves were procured/kidnapped from the interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1833</td>
<td>The British abolish slavery; trade in the Niger Delta is now dominated by another commodity, Palm Oil to feed soap making industries in European cities like Manchester and Liverpool.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th Century</td>
<td>Trade continues to be dominated by Palm Oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>British declare interest in controlling the lucrative Palm Oil Trade, declare the Niger Delta to be the “Oil Rivers Protectorate”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>The Akassa War, led by King Koko. This was the first major attempt by a Niger Delta state to challenge British authority in the Niger Delta. It was triggered by grievances, a common theme in conflict in the Niger Delta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>The Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria was formed by merging Southern Nigeria with the Colony of Lagos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Oloibiri-1, the first truly commercial crude oil well in Nigeria was drilled. Crude Oil replaces Oil Palm as the most important commodity in the Niger Delta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>MILESTONE (DESCRIPTIONS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>The Land Use Decree of 1978 which places the ownership of land in the Niger Delta in the hands of government is promulgated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>MOSOP (Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People) led by Ken Saro-Wiwa boycotts the 1993 Presidential Elections, to protest the environmental degradation of Ogoni Land by Shell operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 - 1995</td>
<td>Mass mobilization of Ogonis by Saro-Wiwa against the Nigerian State and International Oil and Gas companies. Saro-Wiwa is hanged later in the year by the Abacha Junta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Kaiama Declaration by the Ijaw Youth Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Odi Massacre: Nigerian Military sacks Odi Town killing hundreds in the process, in response to the killing of security personnel by Odi youths.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>13% Derivation Principle implemented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 – 2009</td>
<td>Peak era of Niger Delta Militancy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1.4.2. MILITANCY IN THE NIGER DELTA

Militancy in the Niger Delta is linked to the wider Niger Delta struggle, which predates the Nigerian State. This struggle has been categorised into five main phases.

- The first phase was the anti-colonial struggle against the British in the region, with events like the Akassa War led by King Koko of Brass.
The second phase was during the years leading up to Independence. This led the British to set up the Willink’s Commission to investigate fears of domination of minorities by majority groups in an independent Nigeria.

The third phase was driven by the inability of an Independent Nigeria to assuage minority concerns. This triggered Isaac Boro’s failed secession bid. The creation of states in 1967 by the Federal Government to hem in the Igbo ethnic group helped assuage the fears of Niger Delta minority groups and discouraged them from participating in the secession of Biafra from the rest of Nigeria.

The fourth phase saw the rise of Ken Saro-Wiwa, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and an environmental rights campaign. This phase was largely peaceful and culminated in the The Kiama Declaration (1998). Unfortunately, the Federal Government responded with a violent crackdown which included the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa, punitive expeditions, destruction of communities, murder and rape by security agencies and other repressive acts.

The fifth phase of the Niger Delta struggle was triggered by the government’s default violent response to the agitations of the Niger Delta people. This phase was characterised by the rise of radical militant leaders such as Asari Dokubo, Ateke Tom, Soboma George, “General” Boyloaf, etc. A key milestone was the launch of an amnesty programme under the late President Umaru Yar’adua to resolve issues between the government and militants in the Niger Delta.

Six decades since Nigeria’s independence, the Niger Delta question is yet to be answered. The peace appears to be temporary. Unemployment remains a major issue, and this is compounded by the proliferation of small arms.
2.1.5. SOURCES OF WEAPONS IN SOUTHERN NIGERIA

2.1.5.1. LOCALLY MANUFACTURED WEAPONS

The Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON), Kaduna is the major legally authorised manufacturer of small arms in Nigeria. DICON was established in 1964 and it currently has the capacity to produce.

| 5000 units of BM 59 rifles per annum | 18,000 units of SMG 12 per annum | 12,000,000 rounds of 7.62mm x 51 per annum and; | 4,000,000 rounds of 9mm x 19 per annum |

DICON continues to be a primary source of small arms for the Nigerian Military.

Southern Nigeria has a long history of local fabrication of firearms. Communities like Awka in the South East were well known as far back as the pre-colonial era for their blacksmiths and fabrication of small firearms like dane guns. There was also significant development of weapons technology during the Nigerian Civil War, and Awka still remains a centre for the fabrication of firearms. Illegal weapons factories have also been discovered in other towns such as Enugu and Calabar.

It is difficult to estimate the volume of locally manufactured weapons produced in this region. However, a briefing paper of the Small Arms Survey outlined the following important results/observations:

- According to a briefing paper of Small Arms Survey on craft weapons in Nigeria, it was discovered that “about one-fifth (17%) of civilian rural weapons-holders countrywide, possess craft weapons and one-tenth in urban areas, according to preliminary findings from the National Small Arms and Light Weapons Survey (NSALWS).”
• Also, based on its media review of 1559, 73% of weapons seized between 2014 and 2017 were found to be locally manufactured weapons.

• In 2016, the South East coordinator on House Survey of the Presidential Committee on Small Arms and Light weapons stated that 60% of the illegal arms in the South East geopolitical zone were made locally.

2.1.5.2. POINTS OF ENTRY OF INTERNATIONALLY SOURCED WEAPONS

There are many different points of entry for internationally sourced weapons. East European and Asian nations are the major sources of illegal arms in Southern Nigeria.

• Some of the ships laden with consignments of illegal weapons anchor on international waters off the Gulf of Guinea, and then link up to armed smugglers in speed boats.

• Shipments of weapons have been found to originate from Iran, Turkey, the United States, and via other West African states such as Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.

• In October 2012, members of the Nigerian Navy arrested 15 Russians and impounded their vessel for illegally entering Nigerian waters. Upon the inspection of their undeclared cargo, about 8,598 rounds of ammunition, 14 AK47 rifles and 20 Benelli MRI rifles were found.

• Istanbul, Turkey is another major source for illegal weapons in Nigeria. In May 2017, the Tin Can Island command of the Nigeria Customs Service intercepted and seized a container load of arms originating from Turkey; in total 440 firearms were seized. In September of 2017, the Nigeria Customs Service agents at Tin Can port again seized a container loaded with 1100 pump action rifles all originating from Turkey and wrongly labelled.
The Conflict Armament Research group’s publication on the Fulani Herders’ violence on farming communities in Northern Nigeria remarked on the presence of weapons from Turkey. This point was emphasized in the following statement: “Bulk trafficking by sea from Turkey is an unexpected source of illicit weapons in Nigeria. Ten of the 148 weapons in the data set are Turkish-manufactured pump-action and semi-automatic shotguns; eight of them are marked with JOJEFF and BABALE brands.”

In May 2019, a Bulgaria based American arms dealer was arrested for brokering the sale of arms and ammunition to the Nigerian government without having the license to do so.

In the period leading to the 2015 General Elections in Nigeria, the Nigerian government made attempts to purchase weapons from South Africa to fight the Boko Haram terrorist sect after it claimed it was unable to purchase weapons from Western countries. Although this ended in embarrassment of the Nigerian Government, the recent seizure of a container loaded with arms in South Africa and headed for Nigeria shows that South Africa is also a hub for weapons trafficking.

### 2.1.5.3. STATISTICS AT POINTS OF ENTRY

Point of entry statistics (i.e. volume of weapons seized and registered by the Nigerian Customs Service) do not correlate with estimates on the volume of arms in circulation in Nigeria.

Thus, recorded data at the various ports of entry does not do justice to the number of arms proliferating in Nigeria.

- Some of the biggest discoveries in the last five years occurred in 2017, with at least three shipments all originating from Turkey.

- But earlier, in 2010, what was probably the largest intercepted shipment of the Nigerian Customs of firearms at the point of entry occurred. Thirteen containers
loaded with explosives of various types including rockets, rocket launchers and grenades were seized. This shipment was alleged to have been from Iran.

- In November 2010, the Iranian Foreign Minister flew to Nigeria for discussions with members of the Nigerian government on the seized weapons.

- Both suspects involved in this incident were charged to court and were in 2013 sentenced to five years in prison.

- After the seizure of 661 pump action rifles at the Apapa port in January 2017, three suspects were promptly arrested by Nigerian Custom Service officials; these include the alleged importer of the weapons, the clearing agent of the container, and the person meant to accompany the weapons to its eventual destination.

- In response to the frequent importation of arms from Turkey, the Nigerian government in 2017 held talks with Turkish officials on stopping illegal shipment of arms from Turkey to Nigeria. The Turkish ambassador consequently promised to investigate.

- In August 2019, the Federal Government closed Nigeria's land borders, one of the reasons given for border closure was to end arms proliferation/smuggling. At the point of completing this report, the borders remain closed.

- Before the border closure announcement, the Nigerian Police Force announced a ban on the issuance of new arms licenses.
A summary of some small firearms seizures is as shown in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>ARMS SEIZED</th>
<th>NAME OF AGENCY INVOLVED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20/01/2010</td>
<td>MMIA</td>
<td>1 AK-47</td>
<td>Customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25/01/2010</td>
<td>MMIA</td>
<td>1 Arg-3gun and 2,352 quantity of Pepper bullets/Co2</td>
<td>Customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/06/2010</td>
<td>TIN CAN</td>
<td>516 guns, 86 live ammunitions</td>
<td>Customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/11/2010</td>
<td>APAPA</td>
<td>21,407,933 live ammunitions, 34,062 bomb Mi/Grenhand/Fuze of rockets</td>
<td>Customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/10/2010</td>
<td>APAPA</td>
<td>13 Containers of weapons</td>
<td>Customs, SSS, NPA, NPF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/02/2011</td>
<td>TIN CAN</td>
<td>1 Remington pistol and 15 quantity of 45 calibre ammunition</td>
<td>Customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02/04/2013</td>
<td>MMIA</td>
<td>1 Beretta pistol and 49 live ammunition</td>
<td>Customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/04/2013</td>
<td>MMIA</td>
<td>1 Air Soft gun of Zinc Alloy Shell pistol and 5 Rubber bullets pellets</td>
<td>Customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17/09/2013</td>
<td>TIN CAN</td>
<td>3 Sniper Rifles and 140 live ammunition</td>
<td>Customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/02/2014</td>
<td>MMIA</td>
<td>1,142 live cartridges of 12grammes</td>
<td>customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>LOCATION</td>
<td>ARMS SEIZED</td>
<td>NAME OF AGENCY INVOLVED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/12/2014</td>
<td>MMIA</td>
<td>1 Remington pistol and 20 cartridges</td>
<td>Customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08/07/2015</td>
<td>NAIA</td>
<td>2 shotguns</td>
<td>Customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/07/2015</td>
<td>MMIA</td>
<td>20 Jack knives</td>
<td>Customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/07/2016</td>
<td>TIN CAN</td>
<td>1 Revolver gun</td>
<td>Customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/11/2016</td>
<td>MMIA</td>
<td>3 Unnamed Aerial Vehicle Drone</td>
<td>Customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/12/2016</td>
<td>MMIA</td>
<td>2 Fighter Jets Helicopters</td>
<td>Customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/02/2017</td>
<td>MMIA</td>
<td>150 Live Round of 9mm bullets</td>
<td>Customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/05/2017</td>
<td>TIN CAN</td>
<td>440 Pump Action</td>
<td>Customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/09/2017</td>
<td>TIN CAN</td>
<td>1,100 pump action guns</td>
<td>Customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/01/2017</td>
<td>APAPA</td>
<td>661 firearms</td>
<td>Customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/05/2017</td>
<td>APAPA</td>
<td>440 rifles</td>
<td>Customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/09/2017</td>
<td>TIN CAN</td>
<td>1000 Firearms</td>
<td>Customs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A recent shootout between Nigerian police officers who apprehended a kidnap suspect, and Nigerian soldiers who first opened fire on them – was a bid by the soldiers to rescue the kidnap suspect, which ultimately failed.

2.1.5.4. SUPPLIERS, BUYERS AND PRICING

Recent arrests of arms suppliers in the South West border town of Saki have revealed a bit more about the dynamics of the arms importation business.

- Former staff of now-defunct legal arms importation companies (which were in existence during the military era) appear to have made use of their knowledge of the international arms market, and their links to prominent citizens and politicians, to continue the trade clandestinely.

- The price range of the weapons sold ensured that the buyers were politicians or well-to-do individuals; the politicians usually patronised these dealers during peak political season while the well-to-do individuals purchased these arms as a means of protection.

- A recent shootout between Nigerian police officers who apprehended a kidnap suspect, and Nigerian soldiers - who first opened fire on them – was a failed bid to rescue the kidnap suspect. He was aided and supplied arms by a Nigerian army captain, who was later arrested.

- The accused kidnapper escaped from the court premises but was later apprehended in Benin Republic.

- In Abia State in 2019, a former “army General” suspected of arms trafficking was arrested. Although the army officer was not named, it is alleged that he
was arrested with several guns including an AK47 and some pistols. Police stations in Nigeria were also rumoured to sell weapons to influential citizens

• A recent revelation by Nigerian investigative online news website, Premium Times, about the importation of 1000 AK47’s and two million rounds of ammunition by the former Governor of Ogun State, Senator Ibikunle Amosun, and which the former Governor claims was done legally and handed over to the police, shows how easily governors can abuse their powers and contribute to arms proliferation especially in the build-up to elections.

• Inter-communal violence is also a major driver of arms proliferation.

• Militancy and oil theft in the Niger Delta is a lucrative venture which has fuelled the proliferation of high-calibre weapons. Suppliers of these weapons include traffickers with access to trafficking vessels and security operatives with interests in the illegal oil bunkering business.

• Security operatives have been attacked by criminal elements for the sole purpose of obtaining their officially issued arms.

• A breakdown of the figures analysed by SBM Intelligence between January and July 2018 shows that “In total in the states covered in that period, 78 members of the Nigerian Police have been killed, and their weapons, removed.”

• Southern Nigeria accounted for 29 of these murders; the Niger Delta was responsible for 18, while the South West and South East combined had 11 incidents. (Note that the research excluded the North East region ravaged by Boko Haram).
PRICING

The 2017 Global Financial Integrity report, Transnational Crime and the Developing World puts the average of an AK47 rifle in Nigeria at between $1292 and $2067. When converted to Naira, this is between ₦468,000 and ₦750,000. Locally manufactured weapons can be purchased for as low as ₦5,000.

Clampdowns on illegal gun factories in Nigeria reveals the increasing sophistication of local firearms manufacturers – as locally manufactured AK 47s are now said to be in the market and this drastically reduces the cost of obtaining automatic and semi-automatic weapons.

A summary of small arms pricing is as shown the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF ARMS</th>
<th>PRICE RANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AK-47 Rifle</td>
<td>₦300,000 – ₦1,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K1 rifle</td>
<td>₦200,000 – ₦900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pump Action Rifle</td>
<td>₦250,000 – ₦500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol</td>
<td>₦150,000 – ₦600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locally made Pistol</td>
<td>₦5,000 – ₦50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locally made AK-47 Rifle</td>
<td>₦300,000 – ₦350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locally made Single-barrel gun</td>
<td>₦10,000 – ₦40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locally made Dane gun</td>
<td>₦6,000 – ₦30,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.1.5.5. INTERNAL HUBS (STORAGE LOCATION AND TRANSHIPMENT POINTS)

Factors such as the secrecy surrounding weapons’ smuggling and sales and Nigeria’s lengthy and porous borders makes it difficult to identify internal hubs such as storage locations and transhipment points.

- However, a study on small arms in Nigeria by Hazen and Homer for Small Arms Survey, in 2007, identified “the three most notorious arms smuggling frontiers in Nigeria are in the south-west (Idi-Iroko in Ogun state and Seme in Lagos state), the south (the port city of Warri in Delta state), and at the north-east border with Niger and Cameroon (Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states).”

- Hazen and Homer, citing Nigeria Customs seizure data between 1999 and 2006, point to the Southern Nigeria locations of Lagos, Port Harcourt, Seme/Badagry, Ogele/Sagamu, Lekki-Ajahah beach, Ijebu Ode, Idiroko, Osun, Oyo, and Owerri, as major distribution points.

- Unlike the South-East and South-West, weapons coming into the Niger Delta are mostly gotten directly from ships berthing offshore. Transactions are usually in cash, or by directly bartering illegally obtained crude oil for weapons.

- Transhipment points of these weapons are mostly in Benin Republic, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Libya, Mali, and Niger, in addition to more distant locations like Bulgaria, China, Kosovo, Serbia, South Africa, Turkey, and Ukraine.

- Weapons transhipped from Burkina Faso are usually hidden in sacks of dried animal skin and transported in lorries. Weapons from Benin Republic are usually transhipped in yam flour and rice sacks and transported via trucks - as these are often the least-inspected goods.

- Weapons meant for the markets of South-Eastern Nigeria, are usually concealed in large bundles of imported used clothes popularly known as “okrika.”
A potential supplier of locally made weapons in Yala, Cross River State, told an SBM Intelligence researcher that he could deliver weapons to him anywhere in Nigeria in a bag of garri, a locally-made derivative of cassava.

### 2.1.5.6. DISTRIBUTION METHODS AND CHANNELS

Distribution methods and channels vary depending on the quantity of weapons being distributed. A vignette from Hazel and Homer illustrates the distribution process.

**DISTRIBUTION (BY HAZEL AND HOMER)**

“A dealer will place an order for a client for specific types of small arms and specified quantities. The dealer does not keep these in stock, but instead purchases them as they are ordered. Once an order is made, the dealer, or an associate, will travel to the Tudu market in Ghana, where weapons traders from across West Africa can purchase small arms on the wholesale market.

The weapons are purchased, disassembled, and transported by road back to Nigeria. The weapon parts are placed in empty fruit or vegetable tins or other innocuous containers to avoid detection. In Lagos, the shipment is shifted to another transporter, who is responsible for getting the shipment to its delivery point, the buyer.

As security for safe delivery, the transporter carries ₦50,000 (USD 400) in cash, provided by the dealer, to use to bribe security checkpoints or to ensure his delivery to a ‘safe’ police station that is regularly provided by dealers with funds to ensure its personnel’s complicity, should he be stopped.

This money ensures his release and his ability to complete his delivery.”
2.1.6. IMPACT OF SMALL ARMS ON INSECURITY

Small arms in use in Southern Nigeria range from rifles, to revolvers, sub-machine guns, assault rifles, and light machine guns. Some of the assault rifles known to be in use in Nigeria include the Russian AK 47, the German G3, Czech machine guns, FN-FAL from Belgium, and RPG’s from Serbia. The South Korean-made K1 has also been spotted in use during communal clashes in Ogoni, Rivers State.

Other weapons including; anti-aircraft guns, hand grenades, pump action rifles and submachine guns have been identified.

In Southern Nigeria, a combination of arms proliferation, and high youth unemployment and underemployment, is a combustible mix, facilitating social ills like armed robbery, kidnapping, electoral violence, ethnic and communal clashes, and cultism.

2.1.6.1. ARMED ROBBERY

Southern Nigeria is more susceptible to armed robbery than Northern Nigeria. The following chart illustrates crime fatalities by state.

Figure 1: Crime Fatalities in Nigeria by State, (June 2006-September, 2015)

Source: Nwankwo, V. O. and James, O (2016)
Examples of recent armed robbery incidents

On 29 January 2020, a member of the National Youth Service Corp was shot and killed by a two-man armed robbery gang in Osun State. On 6 February 2020, two banks in Ondo State were attacked by a 20-man armed robbery gang. Two police officers were shot dead in this incident.

2.1.6.2. KIDNAPPING

The proliferation of arms has also led to a rise in kidnap-related incidents in Southern Nigeria. Kidnapping was initially confined to the Niger Delta. Foreign oil workers were the first targets, but this gradually expanded to include affluent persons and has today spread to become a serious menace in Southern and Northern Nigeria.

Important kidnap cases include:

- In June 2017, a high-profile kidnapper, Chukwudi Onuamadike, simply known as Evans, was arrested by the police in the Magodo area of Lagos.
- In January 2018, the Special Adviser on Lands and Survey to the Governor of Rivers State was kidnapped in a hotel in the state capital.
- In June 2018, a commercial bus plying the Emouha section of the East West road was hijacked and its passengers and driver kidnapped.

The NYA Risk report in 2017 which is compiled from an analysis of a database of over 19,000 kidnap incidents worldwide identified Nigeria as being the country with the highest number of incidents in Africa for 2017. The report further remarked that, “The threat from kidnap for ransom is primarily fuelled by endemic corruption, inadequate policing and economic inequality. Incidents are reported across the country but are particularly concentrated within the Niger Delta region, due to the prevalence of pirate gangs and criminal groups, as well as in the North Eastern region where the Islamist militant group, Boko Haram, remains active.”
Insecurity linked to arms proliferation in the Niger Delta was the motivation behind three security-related legislations in Rivers State: **The Neighbourhood Safety Corps Bill, the State Anti-Cult Bill, and the Rivers State Anti-Kidnap bill (Prohibition).** While the Neighbourhood Safety Corps Bill establishes a security outfit to deal with public safety, the Anti-Cultism Bill recommends life imprisonment and the death penalty for cultists, and the death penalty is legislated as the punishment for kidnapping.

**Key data on kidnapping in various states in Nigeria is presented in the following chart:**

![Graph showing incidents and fatalities during kidnap attempts in Nigeria, 2011 to Q1 2020]

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**Incidents and fatalities during kidnap attempts in Nigeria, 2011 to Q1 2020**

- **Red** Fatalities during kidnap attempts
- **Black** Number of kidnap incidents

**Source:** ACLED, CFR, SBM Intel
2.1.6.3. ELECTORAL VIOLENCE

Elections in Southern Nigeria have generally been violent, especially in key Niger Delta states like Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta, and Akwa Ibom.

- In February 2015 after the general elections were postponed, the National Human Rights Commission presented a report stating that 58 persons had been killed in pre-election violence. Two out of the three most affected states - Lagos and Rivers - accounted for 28 deaths.

- Data gathered during the 2019 Presidential and General elections (over the period between November 2018 and March 2019) by SBM Intelligence shows that Rivers State had the highest number of fatalities with 55 deaths. Followed by Lagos and Delta states with 27 deaths each.

Details are shown in the following chart:

Chart: Electoral Violence by State (Southern Nigeria)  
Source: SBM Intelligence
2.1.6.4. CULTISM

Violent gangs, often referred to as cults in Nigeria, have always operated in Southern Nigeria, enabled by the proliferation of small firearms. The 1980s saw the rise of violent cults in university campuses. There is evidence that former university cult members later got involved in thuggery, intimidation and violent politics. Violent campus cults have also been known to influence secondary school students.

- In Abia State, during the governorship election of 2007, busloads of cultists from the various higher institutions within the state and its neighbouring states, were brought in by the candidate of the People's Democratic Party; and armed with weapons to ensure his victory.

- Lagos state has continued to record gang violence. The Badoo cult group which operates from Ikorodu and engages in violent killings, sometimes of whole families, is an example. In January 2020, a cult clash between the KK and Eiye cults in Lagos state left at least seven people dead. In December 2019 in Ikorodu (which is emerging as an epicentre of gang activity in Lagos State), two people were killed and many others injured during violent cult clashes between the Aiye and Eiye cult groups.

- In the research study of datasets between 2006 and 2015 carried out by Nwankwo, there were 2363 deaths from cult-related activities in 28 states of Nigeria. Of that number, Rivers state accounted for the most deaths with 765 deaths, while Lagos followed in second place with 323 deaths; Edo with 306 deaths, Delta with 202, Bayelsa with 104 deaths, and Ondo with 99 deaths. The data set also revealed that there were sharp increases in 2006 and 2007 and 2014 and 2015, all in the build up to elections.

- Research by SBM Intelligence during the 2019 elections showed that as the elections drew closer, the various strands of gang violence and political violence merged as most of the violence appeared to be committed by the same actors. It is important to point out that guns supplied to gang members by politicians in the build up to elections are never recovered.
In a January 2020 Amnesty International report on cult-related killings in Rivers State, it was found that “the rise in cult related violence is as a result of government’s failure to investigate, arrest and prosecute perpetrators, as the culture of impunity continues to embolden further attacks. Residents also alleged that influential politicians often provide arms and protections to violent youth groups.” The report also stated that 60 persons had been killed over ten months in cult-related violence in Khana and Gokana Local Government Areas in Rivers State.

The PIND Annual Conflict report on the Niger Delta which covered the period of January to December 2019 found that there was an increase in conflict risk and lethal violence in the Niger Delta region when compared with 2018. Apart from cult-related violence, other primary causes of lethal violence include communal clashes, organised crime, political tensions, and land disputes. According to the report, gang violence was the most lethal of 2019, measured by fatalities per incident. Of the 78 reported incidents of gang or cult violence in the Niger Delta, there were 272 casualties.
2.1.6.5. MASS KILLINGS

- On Sunday 6 August 2017, at St Philip’s Catholic Church located at Amakwa Ozubulu in Ekwusigo Local Government Area of Anambra state, at least 12 worshipers were shot dead and another 27 sustained various injuries when a young man entered the church during mass and opened fire on the congregants in what has been described as a drug-related massacre.

- On New Year’s Day in 2018, as Christian worshippers returned from their vigils in Omoku in Rivers State, armed men opened fire on them killing at least 16 persons who were mostly women. The leader of the group and orchestrator of the attacks, was known as Don Wanny, a militant leader who had embraced amnesty given by the Rivers State government some years earlier. He was killed by security operatives a few weeks later.

Fatalities in violent attacks deliberately targeting civilians, 2011 to Q1 2020.

Source: ACLED, SBM Intelligence
2.1.6.6. INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

Small arms-fuelled violence has also led to the internal displacement of persons from the areas affected by such violence. In Southern Nigeria, this has mostly occurred in the oil-rich Niger Delta region.

- Communities that have witnessed large scale internal displacement of persons in Rivers state include: Buguma, Ogbakiri, Ogoni, Okrika, and Tombia, and some others within Warri in Delta state. In Ogbakiri in Rivers State, violent clashes brought about by chieftaincy tussles and cultural impropriety led to a prolonged cycle of violence which lasted from 1995 up until 2004. The crisis involved the burning of houses, schools, and churches, forcing survivors to flee to neighbouring communities and other parts of the state.

- A falling out between Asari Dokubo, the leader of the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force, and Ateke Tom, the leader of the Niger Delta Vigilantes (also known as Iceland), during and after the 2003 elections, led to violent clashes that spread from Buguma, Ogbakiri, Okrika and Tombia, into communities within the Port Harcourt metropolis.

2.1.7. MASS ATROCITIES IN SOUTHERN NIGERIA

Significant mass atrocities have occurred in Southern Nigeria since Independence. In most of these tragic events, the major perpetrator has been the Nigerian State. Examples of mass atrocities include the Asaba Massacre (1967), the Ugep Massacre (1975) and the Umuechem Massacre (1990). However in this report, we will cover recent mass atrocities like the Odi Massacre (1999).

2.1.7.1. ODI, BAYELSA STATE (NOVEMBER 1999)

In November 1999, a criminal gang abducted and murdered 12 police officers in Odi, a community in Bayelsa State. President Olusegun Obasanjo ordered the army into Bayelsa to fish out the perpetrators. On the outskirts of Odi, the gang ambushed the army and engaged them in a brief firefight. Apparently enraged by the ambush, the
army carried out a scorched earth campaign that virtually levelled Odi. Human rights observers put the death toll at one thousand men, women and children.

The military operation lasted for a fortnight during which mortars and heavy calibre machine guns were used against the civilian population.

In February 2013, Justice Lambo Akanbi of the Federal High Court in Port Harcourt ordered the Federal Government to pay ₦37.6 billion as compensation to the victims of the massacre. The court ruled that the invasion of Odi was genocidal, reckless and brutish, and a gross violation of the rights of the victims.
3. NORTHERN NIGERIA

3.1. ARMS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

3.1.1. INTRODUCTION

The term Northern Nigeria is a holdover from the colonial era. It refers to a geographically contiguous area which was the largest sub-national unit under colonial rule. Northern Nigeria is subdivided into the North-Central, North-East and North-West geopolitical regions.

• **The North-West**: comprises of Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, and Zamfara states

• **The North-East**: consists of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe states


A map showing Northern Nigeria and its constituent geopolitical regions is as shown below.
Northern Nigeria is extremely diverse, a lot more diverse than Southern Nigeria. This point is often lost on both Southern Nigerians and external observers who often have a simplified understanding of Nigeria as having a “largely Christian South and a mainly Muslim North.”

There are over 100 different ethnic groups in Northern Nigeria, with the Hausa/Fulani and the Kanuri being the largest and second largest respectively. These two majority Muslim groups also represent the seat of ancient empires.

The Middle Belt is an ambiguously defined entity which extends from Benue, Kwara and Kogi states to possibly Southern Kaduna state. This is easily the most ethnically diverse region in Northern Nigeria and the wider Nigeria, with ethnic groups like the Alago, Angas, Berom, Chawai, Ebira, Eggon, Gbagyi, Idoma, Igala, Igede, Jukun, Katab, Nupe, Tarok and Tiv.

The heterogenous make up of Northern Nigeria (majority Muslim, significant Christian minority), in addition to ethnic diversity, high population growth rates (fertility rates are the highest here), lack of socioeconomic development, large ungoverned spaces, history of religious fundamentalism, long and porous borders, impact of climate change (mainly desertification), and corruption (a consequence of bad governance since independence) – has led to the region having some of the worst human capital development indices in the world, in addition to being an epicentre of violent religious extremism and violence from non-state actors.

**3.1.2. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE**

The objective of this section of the report is to study small arms proliferation in Northern Nigeria with a view to enabling a fact-based linkage to mass atrocities and migration. Special focus will be on:

- Banditry in the North-West
- Fulani Herder-driven violence in the North-Central
- Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East.
The scope of this work includes the use of appropriate methodologies to gather, collate, and analyse available data in order to better understand the trends linking small arms, mass atrocities, and migration in Nigeria.

**Some of the major research questions are:**

- What proportion of locally manufactured weapons are in use?
- What proportion of imported weapons are in use?
- What are the major points of entry for imported weapons?
- Who are the main suppliers and buyers of these arms, and what are the price ranges?
- What are the major internal hubs, such as storage locations, transhipment points, and distribution methods/channels?

In addition, a catalogue of incidents at the various points of entry and the response of appropriate authorities to these incidents will be presented. We will also cover the types of small arms in use in Northern Nigeria, its effects on insecurity, and how they fuel mass atrocities and internal displacement.

### 3.1.3. BACKGROUND

Arms proliferation is a major problem for governments and citizens who are concerned about its devastating impact on internal security.

- According to research carried out in 2017 by the Small Arms Survey, it is estimated that there are more than 1 billion small arms in circulation.
- Out of that number, 87.5% or 875 million of those arms are in the hands of civilians, while law enforcement agencies around the world account for a meagre 2% of that total.
- According to the Small Arms Survey of 2018, there are over 40,009,000 small arms in the hands of civilians or non-state actors in Africa, with 10,972,000 of that number concentrated in the West African sub region where Nigeria is the dominant power and most populous state.
The number of small arms in circulation in Nigeria, in the hands of civilian non-state actors is estimated at 6,145,000 while the armed forces and law enforcement collectively account for 586,600 firearms.

This worrying trend of arms proliferation in Nigeria has had an impact on Nigeria’s internal security, with various armed groups using their access to firearms to challenge the state’s monopoly of violence and leading to the deaths and injury of thousands of innocent citizens.

The rise of the Boko Haram Islamic terror sect in North Eastern Nigeria, and the Fulani Herder versus Farmer conflict in the North-Central region of Nigeria (Nigeria’s breadbasket), are the most recent manifestations of this problem.

This has negatively impacted Nigeria’s internal security and international standing, as Nigeria is now designated the third most-impacted nation by terrorism, according to recent reports, in the unenviable company of Afghanistan and Iraq, and war-torn Syria.

A combination of proliferation of small weapons, already existing state corruption, and mass unemployment has largely been responsible for the rising criminality and violence in Northern Nigeria.

Economics has also played a role. In the Northern Central region, there have been tensions between sedentary farmers and Fulani herders who are increasingly moving southwards due to climate change pressures on pastureland. These tensions have led to armed confrontations, mass killings and displacement of some farming communities. There have also been cases of cattle rustling by armed groups, leading to violent clashes between rustlers and Fulani Herders.

Apart from violent confrontation between Fulani Herders and local farming communities, the North-Central zone is rife with ethnic militias, making it a hotbed for violent ethnic and religious clashes facilitated using small arms. This geopolitical zone accounts for some of the highest levels of violence involving communal groups, with communal militias accounting for over 40% of violent incidents related with political violence according to reports.
Small arms proliferation and related violence in North Eastern Nigeria is significantly different from what obtains in the North-Central and North Western zones. The primary driver of violence are radical Islamic groups attempting to carve a sphere of influence or an Islamic caliphate. The Boko Haram terrorist group operates within this axis.

A 2016 SBM intelligence security report on Nigeria established that the Nigerian military was active in a little over 81% of states of the federation. The military was active in all the Northern states except Katsina, Kebbi, Jigawa and Sokoto in the North-West, and the FCT in the North-Central. In the 21 states where the military was involved in internal security, the small arms related offences being dealt by the military in those states ranged from police issues such as:

- Kidnapping in Bauchi, Kaduna, Kano, and Kogi.
- Cattle rustling in Bauchi, Kaduna, and Zamfara.
- Low intensity conflicts - requiring military intervention - such as the Fulani Herder versus farmer violence, which are mostly found in Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau, and Taraba states.
- The Boko Haram insurgency in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states has overstretched Nigeria's security services and there has been a general failure of Nigeria’s security apparatus to handle the threat of small arms proliferation and its resultant violence.

3.1.4. NORTHERN NIGERIA: AN OVERVIEW OF ARMS-FUELLED VIOLENCE

Northern Nigeria has a long history of volatility and armed violence – at pre-colonial times, colonial and post-independence. The major security challenges in Northern Nigeria related to a proliferation of small arms are presented in the following sections.

3.1.4.1. BANDITRY

Northern Nigeria has a long history of banditry. However, our focus in this report is the post-independence era. Banditry in post-independence Northern Nigeria began as an unintended consequence of the Nigerian Civil War. Proper demobilisation was not
done post hostilities and there was an influx of foreigners from Sahelian nations who took part in the conflict, but who were still in possession of their weapons.

Many were attracted to illegal mining, which soon became associated with violence. A gold mining boom in Zamfara State appears to have driven an upsurge in this kind of violence.

- In order to reduce the violence associated with banditry, the Federal Government suspended mining activities in Zamfara State on 7 April, 2019.
- Around the same period, the Minister of Information, Lai Mohammed, reported that the supply of weapons by illegal miners to bandits in Zamfara continued to drive instability and provided a conducive environment for illegal mining.

The proliferation of small arms is also a driver for other forms of violence/banditry such as cattle rustling - cases have been recorded in Benue, Katsina, Plateau, Nasarawa, Sokoto and other states in Northern Nigeria. The Nigerian military has even been called to intervene a number of times.

In 2019, Governor Aminu Masari of Katsina State approved the death penalty to deter cattle rustling and kidnapping.

Some relevant banditry incidents are listed below:

- In 2018, bandits killed 10 Nigerian troops at the Niger-Nigeria border.
- In August 2019, the Nigerian Government informed the public that over the previous seven months, there were 330 attacks by bandits and 1,460 deaths.
- As recently as February 2020, bandits invaded Bakali village in Kaduna state and burnt a family of 16 to death.
- On 2 March 2020, bandits attacked Kerewa village in Kaduna state, killing at least 50 persons.

According to The Global Rights Mass Atrocities Casualties Tracking Report, in 2019, banditry was responsible for 1075 deaths.
3.1.4.2. HERDER VERSUS FARMER VIOLENCE

A combination of the impact of climate change on the Sahel and population growth (the Sahel Region has one of the world's highest fertility rates), has driven pastoralists further southwards in search of fodder/arable land for their flocks. This has led to competition with farming communities over access to scarce resources like arable land and water bodies.

- These conflicts could be initiated by herders who encroach on farmland and have better access to firearms. Farming communities have also been known to rustle cattle, thus triggering a cycle of violence.
- There is also the problem of established grazing routes being converted to farmland.
- Proliferation of firearms in Northern Nigeria has further escalated this violence.

Data from the International Crisis Group indicates that in the first half of 2018, 1,300 persons were killed in Herder versus Farmer conflicts. While Amnesty International reports indicated that between 2016 and 2018, 3,641 persons have been killed, with 57% of the casualty figure from 2018 alone.

The 2016 SBM Intelligence report on Violence in Northern Nigeria stated that 1355 casualties were recorded in 36 incidents in Northern Nigeria.

- Benue state was the hardest hit with 1,042 fatalities.
- The epicentre of Herder and Farmer violence is the North Central Regions, especially Adamawa, Benue, Plateau, and Taraba states.

The failure of government to settle herder versus herder has led to the formation of ethnic militias by farming communities.

- Some of these ethnic militias source their arms from conflict zones like the North East and the Niger Delta.
- An ICG (International Crisis Group) report stated that “Militias and vigilantes are not new phenomena in the Middle Belt. Over the last decade, some of the region's
so-called indigenous groups – including the Berom and Tarok of Plateau state, the Eggon of Nasarawa state and the Jukun of Taraba state, all predominantly farming communities – reportedly formed militias and vigilante groups to fend off Fulani herders whose cattle grazed in their fields."

### 3.1.4.3. THE BOKO HARAM INSURRENCE

The official name of the group referred to as Boko Haram is Jama’atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda’wati wal jihad which means, People committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and jihad. The ideology of the group is based on strict adherence to the Quran, the pursuance of jihad by true Muslims, and opposition to the Nigerian State which it considers to be anti-Islamic. Thus, the group considers Christians and other Muslims as legitimate targets.

Boko Haram was established by Mohammed Yusuf, an itinerant preacher who got involved in the politics of Borno State. The moniker Boko Haram means “Western Education is sinful” in the Hausa language.

#### Key milestones in the evolution of Boko Haram.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>MILESTONE (DESCRIPTIONS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early 2000s</td>
<td>Boko Haram was founded by the late Mohammed Yusuf. Like other millenarian Islamist groups formed throughout Nigeria’s history, such as the Yan Tatsine, Boko Haram was committed to creating an anti-Western Islamic state, using violence if necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 - 2009</td>
<td>Boko Haram supports Ali Modu Sheriff’s bid to be governor of Borno State and is incorporated into his government when he wins. A disciple of Yusuf’s (his father in-law) serves as Borno State’s Commissioner for Religious Affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2009</td>
<td>Hundreds of members of the group are killed, including Yusuf himself. He was taken from his father in-law’s home and shot</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
by the Nigerian Police, who release a video of the moments surrounding his execution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>MILESTONE (DESCRIPTIONS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009 - 2011</td>
<td>The group reconstitutes itself under the more radical leadership of Abubakar Shekau and begins to wage an insurgent campaign against the Nigerian State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Gaddafi, former Libyan strongman, falls, leaving the Sahel awash with his former fighters and weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 - 2015</td>
<td>The scale and scope of the insurgency dramatically increases. After reportedly receiving training and advice from Jihadist groups like Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and Al Shabaab, it undertook a steady string of assassination campaigns, suicide bombings, and massed attacks on civilians and security forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Boko Haram attracts international attention by kidnapping 276 girls in Chibok, Borno State. Many of whom have yet to be released.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 - Present</td>
<td>In response to Nigerian Military tactics, Boko Haram shifts its strategy to guerrilla warfare, no longer holding territory. The group now concentrates its operations around the Lake Chad Region, as opposed to contesting territory across much of the North Eastern Region.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Boko Haram is now said to be split into two main factions.**

- One appears to be loyal to Shekau and is said to be centred in the Sambisa Forest.
- While the other, often referred to as ISWAP (Islamic State’s West Africa Province), was until recently commanded by Yusuf’s son, Abu Musab al-Barnawi. The main cause of the split is said to be over a dispute on how civilians should be treated.
According to the Global Terrorism Index, the Boko Haram group is the fourth deadliest terror group in the world, and the deadliest in Sub Saharan Africa. Its report states that, “Since its rise in 2009, Boko Haram has been responsible for thousands of deaths throughout the Lake Chad Basin region of West Africa. The Salafi-jihadi insurgency has led to 35,000 combat-related deaths and 18,000 deaths from terrorism since 2011, mainly in Nigeria.”

Data from the Nigerian Security Tracker Project of the Council for Foreign Relations (CFR) puts the total number of deaths from the Boko Haram conflict since 2011 at 37,009.

Graph: Tracking the Impact of the Boko Haram Conflict,
Source: Council for Foreign Relations

3.1.5. SOURCES OF WEAPONS USED IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

Some observed sources of small arms include.

- Weapons sourced from outside Nigeria (most of the weapons in use in North-East and North-West Nigeria) fall into this category.
- There is a higher proportion of locally-sourced weapons in North Central Nigeria.
- Many of the weapons used from Boko Haram are sourced from former Libyan stock and abandoned/captured stock from the Nigerian Military.
3.1.5.1.  **LOCALLY-SOURCED WEAPONS**

Locally manufactured arms, which are normally fabricated in small-scale factories without legal permits, contributes to a large percentage of arms in circulation in Northern Nigeria (especially in North-Central Nigeria).

According to preliminary findings from the National Small Arms and Light Weapons Survey (NSALWS).

- About one-fifth (17 percent) of civilian, rural weapons holders countrywide possess craft weapons and one-tenth in urban areas.
- In Benue and Plateau state both in the North Central region, locally-made weapons are estimated to be used in over 50% of crimes committed (62% for Benue State, 69% for Plateau State and 32% for Adamawa State).
- It is difficult to estimate the volume of locally-produced arms in circulation, but relevant information on locally produced arms is outlined below.
- In Jigawa state in 2018, the police announced the seizure of 116 firearms as part of the nationwide recovery of prohibited firearms in the country. Of this number, 104 (90%) were locally-manufactured firearms.
- In 2016, the police arrested two persons for operating an illegal gun factory in Tsar Village in Vandeikya Local Government Area of Benue state.
- In September 2017, police in the Federal Capital Territory arrested three persons and uncovered an illegal arms factory in Shenagu village.
- In December 2018, another arms factory was uncovered by the police in Benue state in Guma Local Government Area.
- In January 2019, an arms factory was found in Nasarawa state by Nigerian soldiers.
- In April 2019, the Nigerian Army uncovered an arms manufacturing syndicate in Ukum Local Government Area of Benue State.
- The proliferation of local arms factories especially in the North Central zone has been linked to violence in that part of Nigeria.
- In a report published by The Nation Newspapers in 2019, a local arms manufacturer was quoted as saying “we now have a bigger and wider market because of the activities of bandits.”
3.1.5.2. INTERNATIONALLY-SOURCED WEAPONS

It is difficult to estimate the volume and percentage of internationally sourced weapons in Northern Nigeria.

Survey results put the percentage of internationally sourced weapons in Nigeria at 23%, while foreign sourced weapons accounted for 68% of all crimes in Adamawa, 38% in Benue and 31% in Plateau State.

**Significant episodes are listed below.**

- In January 2020, the Nigerian Police announced that it had recovered about “31 assault weapons, 469 live ammunition, 365 live cartridges across the northern region between December 2019 and January 20, 2020.”
- In April 2018, the police in Kano recovered assorted foreign-made weapons which included “37 rifles, 23 pistols, 127 cartridges, 309 rounds of .6mm live ammunition, 86 rounds of .3mm live ammunition, one US-made magnum bow.”
- In 2013, a large store of arms allegedly belonging to Hezbollah was found in the home of a Lebanese national in Kano state. The weapons found included “11 anti-tank weapons, four anti-tank mines, a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and 21 RPG missiles, 17 AK-47s, two sub-machine guns and 76 grenades had been amongst the weapons found.”
- In a Daily Trust report written in August 2019 on confiscated firearms in 2019, it noted that “...from January 2019 to date, security agents seized 138 AK-47 rifles from criminals, with the highest number of 44 in Kaduna, 43 in Katsina, 16 in Adamawa, 11 in the FCT, six in Zamfara, and four in Gombe, among others. Also are 12 seized Pump Action guns with three from Kogi and Rivers states and two each from FCT and Katsina.”

A common trend from these reports is the prevalence of locally-sourced weapons in the North-Central Region and internationally-sourced weapons elsewhere.
There are many points of entry for internationally-sourced weapons. Nigeria's porous borders facilitate the sourcing of weapons from countries bordering Northern Niger such as Chad and Niger (who are also dealing with their own Islamist Insurgencies).

- There are challenges documenting the flow of small arms into Nigeria, but analysis reveals that some weapons originate from Ivoirian and Libyan military stockpiles.
- Ammunition from at least 21 different nations has been used in the Herder versus Farmer conflicts in North-Central Nigeria (some of these nations include Israel, Poland, Brazil, Iran, USA, Czech Republic, Algeria and Egypt).
- According to research by Freedom Onuoha of the University of Nigeria, Nigerian security agencies have intercepted arms in Bakassi, Southern Nigeria, intended for delivery to Boko Haram.

3.1.6. MARKET DYNAMICS

3.1.6.1. SUPPLIERS, BUYERS AND PRICING

Smuggling syndicates take advantage of Northern Nigeria’s long and porous borders, ill-equipped and corrupt customs and immigration staff, and security agents, to smuggle in arms. Notable incidents are outlined below.

- In June 2019, members of an arm smuggling syndicate were arrested by members of the Nigerian Police in South-West Nigeria. Upon interrogation, they confessed to having smuggled thousands of weapons through Nigeria’s borders, especially through the Northern border states of Sokoto, Niger and Katsina.
- Suppliers of illegal weapons in Nigeria also include serving and former security personnel. In 2014, 10 army generals and 5 army officers were court-martialed for supplying arms to Boko Haram.
- In 2019, 26 Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corp and 6 army officers were arrested for supplying arms to bandits in Northern Nigeria.
- Buyers of illegal weapons in Northern Nigeria range from individuals, politicians,
violent criminal gangs, to communities. The political, ethnic, and religious tensions in Northern Nigeria will continue to drive small arms proliferation – as these weapons are used to fight other actors or in self-defence.

Price ranges of small arms are presented in the following table.

**Table: Price Ranges of Small Arms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF ARMS</th>
<th>PRICE RANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AK-47 Rifle</td>
<td>₦300,000 – ₦1,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K1 rifle</td>
<td>₦200,000 – ₦900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pump Action Rifle</td>
<td>₦250,000 – ₦500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol</td>
<td>₦150,000 – ₦600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locally made Pistol</td>
<td>₦5,000 – ₦50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locally made AK-47 Rifle</td>
<td>₦300,000 – ₦350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locally made Single-barrel gun</td>
<td>₦10,000 – ₦40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locally made Dane gun</td>
<td>₦6,000 – ₦30,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.1.6.2. INTERNAL HUBS (STORAGE LOCATIONS AND TRANSHIPMENT)

A study on small arms by Hazen and Homer for the Small Arms Survey in 2007 revealed that three of the most notorious arms smuggling frontiers were in North Eastern Nigerian states like Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. Major shipping routes were via Maigatari, Nguru and Mallam Falori on the Nigeria/Chad border.

- A Nigerian senator, Francis Fadahunsi, while speaking with journalists in December 2019, claimed there are many arms shipment routes in Northern Nigeria which are not monitored by security agencies. In his words, “The animal market in Potiskum, Yobe State is a cover up route through which weapons are smuggled into the country in bits and large quantities.”
- Bandits operating in Northern Nigeria are known to hide their weapons in forests.
- In August 2019, police discovered arms belonging to a kidnap kingpin known as Hamisu Wadume in his homes in Ibi and Jalingo in Northern Nigeria.

3.1.6.3. DISTRIBUTION METHODS AND CHANNELS

Distribution methods and channels vary depending on the quantity of weapons. Weapons are distributed by land, air, or boat, using a combination of motor vehicles, motorcycles, donkeys, camels etc.

A small arms survey report on Nigeria documented the presence of secondary distribution points in places like Jos, Ilorin, Makurdi, Wukari and Takum.
3.1.7. IMPACT OF SMALL ARMS ON INSECURITY

A summary of the impact of small arms proliferation on insecurity in Northern Nigeria is presented in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPACT AREA</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping</td>
<td>The kidnapping rate in Northern Nigeria has steadily risen, with Kaduna State now being the epicentre of kidnapping in Nigeria. The Abuja-Kaduna Expressway is now one of the major kidnapping hotspots in Nigeria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>According to Nigeria’s Inspector General of Police (IGP), in the first quarter of 2019, 685 persons were kidnapped in Northern Nigeria. The IGP also noted that three states in Northern Nigeria accounted for 79.8% of all kidnapping cases in Nigeria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The North-West had the highest incidence with 365 cases, while the North-Central had 145 cases. Zamfara State had the highest national kidnap rate with 281 victims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terrorist groups like Boko Haram have also employed kidnapping as a tactic (e.g. kidnapping of Chibok girls).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic and Religious Crises</td>
<td>A combination of ethnic and religious tensions has created a combustible mix in Northern Nigeria, especially ethnically and religiously diverse North Central and the Middle Belt Region. Notable incidents include.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Religious tensions and violence in Kaduna in the wake of the Sharia Law Crisis in 2001. This led to the deaths of about 3000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ethno-religious tensions in Jos, Plateau State in September 2001, triggered by competition between “indigenes” and “settlers” for political positions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**IMPACT AREA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- Recurring violence between the Tiv and Jukun Ethnic groups in Benue and Taraba states. In September 2019, renewed hostilities between both groups led to the deaths of 600 people according to the West African Network for Peace Building (WANEP).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Mass Killings</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Arms proliferation in Northern Nigeria in the hands of non-state actors has led to the surge in mass atrocities. The main perpetrators of these mass atrocities in Northern Nigeria are the Fulani Herdsmen, and the Boko Haram terrorists. The ability of the various armed groups to get away with armed violence repeatedly has further emboldened them. Some notable incidents.

- At a funeral in Nganzia district in Borno state in June 2019, 65 mourners were killed by members of the Boko Haram terror sect.
- In November 2018, a Boko Haram attack at an army base in Borno state left at least 100 soldiers dead.
- In July 2014, the Human Rights Watch revealed that in six months, the Boko Haram terror group had killed 2,053 civilians.
- In 2018, Boko Haram was revealed to have abducted over 1000 children and killed over 2000 teachers since 2013.
- More recently on the 9th of February 2019, Boko Haram terrorists killed 30 travellers who had been locked out of Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state, who arrived in the state outside of curfew time.
- Fulani Herdsmen in April 2014 attacked the venue of a meeting in Galadima of Zamfara state and killed at least 30 persons.
### Internal Displacement

Arms proliferation in Northern Nigeria has facilitated violent confrontation between Fulani Herdsmen and farmers, Boko Haram terrorists and the military, and banditry. This has led to significant displacement of people from their ancestral communities, livelihoods and jobs. Nigeria now has one of the largest populations of internally displaced people on Earth.

- **Displacements due to Boko Haram activities:** The DTM Nigeria report on displacement in Northern Nigeria reveals that as at January 2019, the number of Internally Displaced Persons from Adamawa, Gombe, Taraba, Bauchi, Borno, and Yobe states was 1,948,349 or 382,296 households.

- **Displacements due to Herder-related violence:** According to the Human Rights Watch country report for Nigeria published in January 2019, violence in the North Central zone of Nigeria brought about by nomadic herder versus farmer conflicts led to the displacement of at least 300,000 persons in 2018.
The main perpetrators of mass atrocities in Northern Nigeria are Ethnic Militias, Fulani herdsmen, the Nigerian State, and Boko Haram terrorists. The ability of the various armed groups to get away with armed violence repeatedly has further emboldened them. Some significant mass atrocities in Northern Nigeria are:

- Zaki Biam, Benue State (October 2001)
- Kuru Karama and Dogon na Hawa, Plateau State (January and March 2010)
- Mambilla, Taraba State (April 2014)
- Zaria, Kaduna State (December 2015)

Further details are provided.

### 3.2.1. ZAKI BIAM, BENUE STATE (OCTOBER 2001)

In late 2001, Tiv militia men in Benue abducted and murdered 23 soldiers. The troops had been deployed to the region as peacekeepers in the long running conflict between the Tiv and Jukun ethnic conflict.

Despite an apology by the state and the recovery of the bodies of the slain troops for burial, the army was dispatched to apprehend the killers. According to eyewitness accounts, upon their arrival, the army rounded up civilians from Zaki Biam and three villages, separated the men from women and children and opened fire on the former, killing 70 people.
The Obasanjo administration pledged to investigate the incident and bring those responsible to book. Whether any such investigation occurred remains unknown.

In July 2007, Justice Lewis Alagoa of the Federal High Court in Enugu ordered the federal government to pay compensation to Zaki Biam in the sum of N41.8 billion. Later that year, the army headed by the then Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Luka Yusuf, tendered a formal apology to Benue State for the massacre in Zaki Biam.

### 3.2.2. KURU KARAMA & DOGON NA HAWA, PLATEAU STATE (JANUARY & MARCH 2010)

After an attack by armed men on Kuru Karama, a mostly Muslim village 30 kilometres from Jos, on January 19, 2010, 150 bodies were recovered from wells and sewage pits in the community. Many of the bodies had massive burns, gunshot injuries and signs that the victims had been hacked to death.

The Village Head of Kuru Karama said that more than 60 people were missing after the attack while Muslim officials told Human Rights Watch that 364 Muslims had been killed. The attackers had also razed homes. The village was virtually wiped out.

In an apparent reprisal attack in March 2010, hordes of armed men invaded Dogon na Hawa, a mostly Christian community south of Jos and killed as many as 500 people many of whom were women and children. Witnesses and police officials identified the attackers as Muslim herders of Hausa-Fulani extraction. The raiders had set upon the villagers with machetes killing women and children in their homes and ensnaring the men who tried to flee in fish nets and animal traps before massacring them.

Witnesses characterized the attack as “a sort of vengeance from the Hausa-Fulani.” Subsequently the police announced that it had made arrests, including a number of Hausa Fulani. According to the Police spokesman, Mohammed Larema, the clothes of many of the suspects were bloodstained.

The tit-for-tat attacks were part of a long-running cycle of conflict in Plateau State in which ethnic and religious identities overlap with contention over resources, notably land disputes.
3.2.3. MAMBILLA, TARABA STATE (APRIL 2014)

From the 17th to the 21st of June 2017, an armed group identified as the Mambilla ethnic militia carried out a massacre of Fulani residents in Gembu Local Government Area of Taraba State.

The killings went on for four days until the army and the police were deployed. The Fulani community said that the Mambilla militia had killed 200 people, looted and razed 180 Fulani villages and maimed or killed 4,000 herds of cattle.

They said that state and local authorities had done nothing to stop the killings even though they continued non-stop for four days. It took federal authorities deploying the army and police to the area for the massacre to halt. The military later blamed the Mambilla community leaders for failing to prevent the killings and refusing to help the wounded who they watched die helplessly. The military also accused local politicians of inciting the violence against the Fulani.

3.2.4. MARU, ZAMFARA STATE (APRIL 2014)

For a decade, Zamfara State has been the ground zero of a spreading epidemic of banditry in the rural northwest. These bandit gangs first emerged as cattle rustlers raiding herders in the agrarian communities of Zamfara in the late 2000s. They have since expanded their criminal activities to kidnapping and armed robbery.

In April 2014, vigilantes and local hunters from Zamfara and three neighbouring states, Kaduna, Kebbi and Katsina met in Yar Galadima village in Maru Local Government Area of Zamfara to discuss a response to the threat posed by bandits. In the course of the meeting, over a hundred gunmen on motorbikes invaded the community and launched an assault on the vigilantes.

According to eyewitness accounts, the attackers killed 200 people. The police later claimed that the death toll was far lower at 72. It is the single deadliest incident in the conflict in Zamfara that has pit Fulani armed gangs against communities and local vigilantes.
The vigilantes themselves became renowned for impunity and engaging in cattle rustling and other criminal activities. In May 2015, the Miyetti Allah Association accused the Yan Sakai of killing over 700 Fulani herders in raids during which they seized 6,790 cows, 13,400 sheep and over 400 camels over a five-month period. The Zamfara Police Command has serially accused the vigilantes of armed robbery, extra judicial killings and “many atrocities.”

3.2.5. ZARIA, KADUNA STATE (DECEMBER 2015)

In December 2015, the convoy of the Chief of Army Staff was embroiled in a traffic altercation over right of way with a procession of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), a Shia Muslim sect in Zaria.

The army claimed that the incident was an attempt to assassinate its commander saying that the IMN “barricaded” the road and obstructed the convoy. On its part, the IMN claimed that the military staged the incident as a pretext to attack the group. The convoy extricated itself from the situation by forcing its way out of the blockade. Subsequently, troops launched an assault on the headquarters of the IMN and the residence of the sect’s leader, Sheikh Ibraheem El-Zakzaky. This resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths.

During the public hearings of a judicial commission of inquiry, the Kaduna State Government disclosed that 347 members of the IMN had been killed by the army during the invasion and secretly buried in a mass grave by the state.

According to the Sisters Forum of the IMN, the army killed 287 women, 197 children and 23 pregnant women between December 12 and 14, 2015. The judicial commission of inquiry which was established by the Kaduna State Government concluded that the military had used “excessive force” against the IMN. It indicted Major General Adeniyi Oyebade, the commander of the 1st Division in Kaduna, for ordering the assault on the IMN premises without recourse to the chain of command and called for his prosecution alongside other culpable officers. The Commission also noted that both the military and the IMN had refused to cooperate with it during its proceedings.

No soldier or officer of the Nigerian Army has been prosecuted.
4. INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

3.4. INTRODUCTION

By the end of 2014, it was estimated that there were 38.2 million (Internally Displaced Person) IDPs worldwide, the highest level since 1989, the first year for which global statistics on IDPs were available.

The countries with the largest IDP populations were Syria (7.6 million) and Colombia (6 million). Nigeria, with a total population of 2.2 million Internally displaced persons, ranks 7th from a list of top 10 countries with IDPs in the world.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>REASON</th>
<th>NUMBER OF IDPS (IN MILLIONS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>CIVIL WAR</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, GUERILLA GROUPS--FARC AND ELN</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>ETHNO RELIGIOUS CONFLICT</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>TERRORISM</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>TERRORISM</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>CIVIL WAR</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>TERRORISM</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>TERRORISM</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>FAMINE, DROUGHT</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, TERRORISM</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: Top 10 countries with internally displaced people.

Data source: Global Report on Internal Displacement, GRID 2019 by Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
By the end of 2018, a report written by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre put the figure of internally displaced persons in Nigeria at about 2.2 million people. The report states that in 2018 alone, 541,000 were displaced.

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Boko Haram insurgency has displaced over 2 million people in the Lake Chad Basin area including:

- 244,000 Nigerian refugees
- Over 2 million internally displaced people in Nigeria.
- Over 550,000 internally displaced people in Cameroon and Chad.
- The most affected regions in Nigeria are Nigeria’s North Eastern states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe.

The drivers of mass displacement include, generalised violence, violations of human rights, high rate of insecurity, mostly in the Northern part of the country; Boko Haram attacks, the continuous Fulani herdsmen and Farmers crisis which has spread across the six geopolitical zones in the country, communal crisis with the locals in Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa, Plateau, and Taraba states respectively, as well as in Ogoja, Cross River state which borders Ebonyi state and Cameroon.

SBM Intelligence also confirmed other reasons for the extremely high numbers of IDPs in Nigeria to include natural or human-made disasters (like floods) and in most cases, scarcity of resources. IDPs live within the local populations but are pressured to flee their homes and in some instances, to seek refuge in border countries.

In 2014, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) estimated that as many as 1,000 refugees a week flee Nigeria mainly because of violence from Boko Haram; crossing the border into Niger’s Diffa region to seek refuge.

SBM carried out a qualitative field research to ascertain the public perceptions on proliferation of small arms and light weapons, mass atrocities and refugees in Nigeria. The survey was conducted in Nigeria’s 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT).
### 3.5. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The summary of findings is presented in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>COMMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abuja (FCT)</td>
<td>The Bama Refugee camp in Lugbe area was visited, but for some reasons, nobody above 18 years of age was willing to engage with our researchers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anambra</td>
<td>Researchers visited the Umueri General Hospital Holding Centre, Anambra West LGA in Anambra state; it was set up as an IDP camp for flood victims in and around Anambra West local government area.</td>
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<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>The camp is now deserted. A nurse, Mrs. Florence, informed the team that the camp no longer exists as flood victims have since returned home. Due to security challenges, it was not possible to access IDP camps.</td>
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<td>Bayelsa</td>
<td>The Ogbia, Opokuma and Ogbopina IDP camps, all situated in Kaiama community in Kolokuma Opokuma Local Government Area and Amassoma community in Bayelsa State were visited by our researchers.</td>
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<td>The respondents detailed were displaced by a major flood which destroyed property worth hundreds of millions of naira, schools, farmlands, worship centres and roads in 2018.</td>
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<td>They solicited for the establishment of a flood and erosion commission, urging the Niger Delta ministry and the</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) to assist communities prone to flood disaster in the states to find a lasting solution.</td>
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<td>Cross River</td>
<td>SBM visited IDP camps at Abagena and Dadu in Benue state, one of the respondents in Yerwada community revealed to us that she experienced an attack carried out by the Boko Haram terrorist group leaving a number of casualties, making her flee the community to seek refuge in Dadu camp. Another respondent on video told us that she was also affected by the terror unleashed by Boko Haram terrorists in Dadu.</td>
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<td>Delta</td>
<td>Researchers sought to access the IDP camp at Ogoja which houses refugees from conflicts in Cameroon. Access was finally granted after two attempts – on the condition that no videos or pictures of the premises were to be taken. Researchers interviewed two internally displaced persons – obtaining information from them. A short video recording was secretly done and transmitted immediately, before security personnel accosted the researchers and forced them to delete it. SBM visited the Obiaruku IDP camp, which was constructed to house victims of the same flood disaster that devastated communities in Bayelsa State. On getting to the site, it was discovered that camp had been closed as displaced persons had returned to their homes. Researchers also visited the Ovmiah IDP camp in Abbi Delta</td>
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<td>Edo</td>
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Edo state, where they met the Nene Motewee family; a family of four. Mrs Nene is originally from Ghana, married into the Owori Kinsmen. She and her family had to seek refuge in Obiaruku community but were forced to relocate to Ovmiah IDP camp due to flooding. She is a widow, having lost her husband in 2018 to sickness. Since then, life has been very difficult for her and her family.

She appreciated the efforts of the state government and other individuals who provided relief materials.

SBM visited an IDP camp established by the International Christian Centre (ICC), located in a forest at Uhogua community in Ovia North East Local Council, Benin City.

The camp houses more than 3,000 displaced persons from the Northern part of Nigeria, especially those displaced by Boko Haram violence and victims of Fulani herdsmen.

The camp was established to cater for orphans and the destitute.

Questionnaires were filled by IDPs and the camp caregiver. The caregiver prevented respondents from granting video and audio interviews as this is against camp policy. However, the caregiver granted an audio interview where she talked about the history and present condition of IDPs.

She explained some of the displaced persons have gained admission into tertiary institutions across the country. However, the camp still needs skills acquisition facilities to cater for many who may not proceed to tertiary education.
The name of the administrator of the camp is Pastor Folorusnho Solomon.

### Enugu

Researchers interviewed two disabled beggars along the Enugu-Onitsha highway.

An IDP survey of the Nimbo community at Uzo-Uwani local government area was carried out; Nimbo shares a border with Nsukka, where the University of Nigeria is located. The Nimbo community (which has five villages) was raided by alleged Fulani herdsmen on 25 April 2016.

A victim of the attack was more than happy to share the details of his ordeal. A detailed video recording of the interview was made.

### Gombe

No IDP camps were found in Gombe State

### Kaduna

In Kaduna state, a field researcher visited the following IDP camps: Adara Hall, Sabo and Mararaban Rido. Adara Hall camp checked out all internally displaced persons at night. SBM visited Mararaban Rido, which is a private IDP camp. The Pastor of Jesus Is Lord Ministries within the community claimed to have housed some women and children who claimed to be IDPs for 10 days, thereafter, their supposed husbands came to take them away.

The camp at Adara Hall, Sabo, is an unofficial IDP camp. Indigenes of Adara in Kajuru LGA who live in Kaduna town opened their Town Hall in Sabo to Internally Displaced Persons. The IDPs are mainly women, children & old men.
They do not sleep in the hall; they find any shelter or beg the people in the community for a place to sleep

Kebbi

SBM enquired about IDP camps in Kebbi state, only to find out there are none. We sought to speak to prostitutes but in their group, they refused to be interviewed; they were not comfortable, making it impossible to get anyone to talk to.

Our field researcher inquired further to know why they were reluctant to talk or be recorded. One explained they believed the Nigerian Government plans to deport them. They said a survey was carried out early in 2019 relating to migration and they were warned by colleagues not to participate in such again.

Kogi

The crisis in Kogi state appeared to be heating up. At Omala local government of Kogi state, SBM witnessed the after effect of the crisis at the IDP camp within the community.

The crisis has been on and off since 2015 resulting in casualties and loss of property.

Suspected herdsmen attacked Gbagana, Ogba, Patini, Abejukolo all in Omala local government. This led to the inhabitants of the affected villages fleeing to neighbouring villages. SBM also caught up with two affected victims after and interviewed them.

Kwara

It was difficult locating an IDP camp. The central mosque at Oja Gboro, a few kilometres away from the Emir of Ilorin’s Palace was visited, where some beggars were interviewed.
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<td>Nasarawa</td>
<td>One respondent, a beggar, formerly resided in Kaduna state but fled to settle in Kwara State due to the violence in Kaduna State. He was scared to talk to us, but we reached an understanding. He spoke to us in native Hausa on record. No IDP camps were found within the towns which are presumably the safest parts of the state; Akwanga, Keffi and Lafia had no official or unofficial IDP camp. The only IDP camps anyone knew of was in the interior villages that were not considered safe. Thus, our researchers were not able to visit them. On one of our tours, a trip to Lafia, a field researcher encountered some trouble as unknown gunmen had killed several people in a village near Akwanga. There was a roadblock for security checks while protesters came out in their numbers but were restrained by the police.</td>
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<td>Niger</td>
<td>The Gabonda Kwamba makeshift IDP camp in Niger state was visited. Here, SBM met with two young men who narrated their terrible experience with Boko Haram. They left their community, Bama in Borno State, because of the high rate of insecurity driven by the Boko Haram terror group. They fled to seek refuge in Niger state. The Gabonda Kwamba IDP camp holds around 800 people, many of whom share similar experiences.</td>
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<td>Ondo</td>
<td>No privately or government run/regulated IDP camps were sighted in Ondo State. Consequently, we decided to reach out to beggars, prostitutes and those banished from their communities for various reasons.</td>
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<td>Oyo</td>
<td>The survey was concentrated at a location called Old Garage, a major gathering spot for beggars. A beggar who was interviewed, Malam Bello, was educated, apparently a graduate of the University of Jos. An ailment took his eyesight, so he had to resort to begging to sustain himself. An IDP camp was visited, but it was not Government approved or regulated. This unofficial camp is located at the Sabo Mokola Market area of Ibadan. IDPs depend on the benevolence of strangers as there is not official/government support for this camp. Most camp inmates were from Northern Nigeria. Many were destitute and either blind, deaf, dumb or disable and have few options but to beg to sustain themselves. Reasons given for their migration include violence, violations of human rights and Boko Haram violence.</td>
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<td>Plateau</td>
<td>An SBM researcher visited Geosciences IDP camp in Anguldi, Zawan Junction, Jos-South, Plateau state to gather responses as regards the operations of Small and Light weapons in committing mass atrocities. The camp appeared calm due to the absence of internally displaced persons. It was noted that most of them had gone to the neighbouring villages and communities to engage in farming and other activities, while some youths left in search of a reliable means of livelihood only to return at sunset. The mining and Geosciences Society, commonly known as Geo-sciences IDP camp in Anguldi- Zawan Junction, Jos</td>
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<td>South L.G.A of plateau state</td>
<td>caters for about 3,526 displaced persons including women and children from Gashish district in Barkin Ladi L.G.A of plateau state who fled in the wake of the mass attack in June 2018 which claimed the lives of over 200 person and destroyed their homes.</td>
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<td>Sokoto</td>
<td>Researchers stopped by two villages in Goronyo local government area of Sokoto state: Gidan Alwad and Gidan Salihu. Both were affected by the floods of 2012. In Sokoto state, natural disaster is the major cause for people resettling.</td>
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<td>Taraba</td>
<td>SBM surveyed the IDP Camp located at the Government Day Secondary School, Joro Gbadi, Jalingo in Taraba state where most of the displaced persons are kept</td>
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SBM Intel is an Africa focused geopolitical research and strategic communications consulting firm focused on addressing the critical need for political, social, economic and market data, and big data analytics. We employ various methods of data collection. Our Data Collection Methodology team advises on data collection methods for all ONS social and business surveys. With clients both within the business and the wider government community, we aim to provide expert advice on data collection procedures and carry out research leading to improvements in survey quality.

Since 2013, we have provided data analytics and strategic communication solutions to clients across various sectors in Nigeria, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, South Africa, the UK, France and the United States. In 2015 we became a partner to Stratfor, an American geopolitical intelligence firm that provides strategic analysis and forecasting to individuals and organisations around the world, including the various US departments and agencies like the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). We also have a partnership with GeoMarkets Africa, an American market research firm focused on explaining the African market for American audiences.

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